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I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial sentencing discretion is alive and well. After almost twenty
years of structured sentencing in federal courts, judicial discretion has been
restored and prosecutorial power has been curtailed. With a much
anticipated decision, the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker' and
United States v. Fanfan2 found that the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines") were unconstitutional. In its rare dual majority opinions, the
Court remedied the constitutional violation by excising two provisions of the
Guidelines and retaining the remainder of the sentencing scheme as
advisory.3  The Booker4 decision restores judicial discretion, a key
component of sentencing that has been absent for the last twenty years.
In Part II, this article will provide an overview of the sentencing
policies, focusing on the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act of 19845
("SRA") and the operation of the indeterminate sentencing scheme that
preceded the Guidelines. The passage of the SRA occurred in response to a
mounting dissatisfaction with a sentencing system that featured widespread
disparity and discrimination.6 Because of the discretionary nature of the
indeterminate sentencing scheme and the resulting disparities in sentences,
legal observers and the public grew critical of a sentencing system that used
imprecise parameters and lacked rational justification. The most notable
I. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 756-57.
4. In this article both decisions are referred to as Booker except where specific reference is
being made to the facts of Fanfan.
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (2000); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-86 (2000).
6. See Edward M. Kennedy, Foreword: Federal Sentencing Guidelines Symposium, 29 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 771, ix (1992) ("Passage of the Act marked the end of a sentencing system that had
long been a national disgrace.").
7. Id. Sentencing anomalies were the horror stories that spurred the federal sentencing authority
revamping. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING 79-145 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15.year/15year.htm [hereinafter
FIFTEEN YEARS]. Defendants could be convicted of the same crime in different federal district
courts across the country and have a wide disparity of sentence imposed depending on the individual
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problems prior to enactment of the SRA were the vastly disparate sentences
received by similarly situated defendants appearing before different judges.8
The SRA created the United States Sentencing Commission "as an
independent commission [with]in the judicial branch. . . ,9 The purpose of
the Commission, as mandated by Congress in the SRA, was to provide
"certainty" and "fairness" in sentencing, two of the hallmarks of due
process.'0 The Commission's task was to "develop means of measuring the
degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are
effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing .... 11 Further, the
Commission sought to establish sentencing policies that "reflect, to the
extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it
relates to the criminal justice process.,' 2
Prior to the Guidelines, judges were not required to state their reasons
for imposing a particular sentence and, often, the sentence reflected the
judicial philosophy and even the prejudices of the individual judge.' 3 In an
effort spearheaded by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the Guidelines were
created by Congress in 1987 in a spirit of bipartisan cooperation and
political compromise. 14  After the passage of the SRA and the
implementation of the Guidelines, Congress established mandatory
minimums,'" the prison population swelled to unprecedented numbers, 16 and
whim of the judge. Id. at 100. Moreover, prosecutorial priorities played a big role in the sentencing
disparities. Id. at 87. For example, in the Southern District of Florida, a federal district handling
voluminous major drug cases, the office routinely declined cases involving arguably significant
quantities of drugs in favor of a state prosecution, cases that would be deemed major investigations
in many other federal judicial districts. See id. at 86. These disparities were by no means limited to
drug cases. For example, in white collar criminal cases, a criminal defendant in one district could be
sentenced to probation, while in another district similar conduct would warrant a sentence of five
years or more. See id. at 80.
8. Kennedy, supra note 6, at ix; see also William W. Wilkins, Jr., Response to Judge Heany, 29
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 795, 797 (1992) ("The actual sentence imposed was too often a result of the luck
of the draw or the assignment of a particular judge to a case.").
9. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2000).
10. Id. § 991(b)(l)(B).
11. Id. § 991(b)(2).
12. Id. § 991(b)(1)(C).
13. See Theresa Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting
Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 396 (1991)
("[Judges] ... enjoyed wide discretion to sentence in accordance with their own theories regarding
criminal sanctions and with any personal biases and prejudices.").
14. Kennedy, supra note 6, at ix.
15. See generally William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums: The
Need for Separate Evaluation, 4 FED. SENT'G REP. 352, 353 (1992); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL
the rigidity of the sentencing practices divided interested observers. 7 This
meant that after 1987, federal judges saw their traditional discretionary
sentencing prerogatives disappear. However, the Booker decision is likely
to reinvigorate judicial discretion. This first section of the article will briefly
review the cycle of sentencing in the federal courts since the 1980s and
demonstrate why the Court's latest decisions have returned sentencing
jurisprudence back to when the SRA first began the dialogue on sentencing
in 1984. In fact, it may be persuasively argued that the Booker decision has
resurrected the true original purposes of the Guidelines as articulated in the
SRA.1" Moreover, prosecutors no longer have presumptive power to pre-
determine a sentence or to control favorable information at sentencing.19
Part III of the article details the decision by the Supreme Court in
Booker. In companion five-to-four majorities comprised of different
Justices,2 ° the Court held that the Guidelines obligated courts to find facts
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991) (noting that there are over sixty federal mandatory minimum
statutes containing over one hundred different mandatory sentencing provisions).
16. The prison population in the United States has reached unprecedented numbers. See
generally PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2003, at 1-12 (Nov. 2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.govbjs/pub/pdf/p03.pdf.
For the reported year 2003, the federal and state prisons held 1,387,000 prisoners. Id. at 1-2. When
added to the 691,301 persons held in local jail facilities, the total number of incarcerated adults has
exceeded two million people. Id. at 1. This translates into I in 140 people in this country who are
incarcerated. Id. at 2. This increase in prison population is likely due to the imposition of
mandatory punishment for non-violent offenders.
17. Critics of the Sentencing Guidelines include individuals from many constituencies, ranging
from Supreme Court Justices and national bar associations to lay members of the public. See, e.g.,
National Bar Ass'n, The Critical Need for Reform of the Sentencing Laws and Policies of the
Federal And State Governments of the United States, REPORT TO ABA JUSTICE KENNEDY
COMMISSION, May 3, 2004, http://www.nationalbar.org/pdf/Kennedy06OlO4.pdf. The National Bar
Association took the strong position that the current policies in the criminal justice system over-
emphasize incarceration and focus on incarcerating people for their addictions. Id. at 3 (explaining
that "the federal sentencing guidelines should permit the exercise of judicial discretion to depart
downward for those women and other young drug users who may engage in minor drug trafficking
merely to get their own drug supply or to avoid duress, coercion or assaultive conduct against them
as victims.").
18. The Booker Court explained that "[f]inally, the Act without its 'mandatory' provision and
related language remains consistent with Congress' initial and basic sentencing intent .... to
'provide certainty and fairness ... [while] maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized
sentences .... " United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 767 (2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C.§ 991(b)(l)(B)). Congress had as its goal avoiding "unwarranted sentencing disparities [but]
permit[ting] ... warranted [disparities]." Id.
19. See discussion infra Part V.B.1.
20. Justice Ginsburg signed both opinions. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 745. The substantive opinion
(holding that the federal Guidelines could not allow a sentence in excess of that authorized by the
jury's verdict) was written by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg. Id. The remedial opinion (holding that two sections of the Guidelines were
unconstitutional and had to be excised) was written by Justice Breyer and joined by Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg. Id. The coalitions were further divided by the six other
concurrences and dissenting opinions filed by eight out of the nine Justices. See discussion infra
Part 1I1.
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that increased a defendant's sentence, a practice which violated the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. 2  The Court reaffirmed the Sixth
Amendment rights of criminal defendants to be sentenced based on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt by excising two sections of the Guidelines and
upholding the remaining body of the Guidelines as advisory only.22 In both
opinions, the Court effectively dismantled much of the power of the
Sentencing Commission, eliminated the mandatory nature of the
Guidelines,2 3 and brought federal sentencing discretion back to the status
that lead to the sentencing debates in the mid-1980s.
24
In Part IV, this article will discuss the dilemma now faced by lower
courts in defining "reasonableness" according to Booker's directives. 25 By
setting forth a reasonableness standard in sentencing policy, the Court
returned to the lower courts much of the discretion that prior sentencing
rules had removed.26 There are two potential extreme interpretations given
to this directive. One possibility is that courts could ignore the sentencing
history of the past twenty years and sentence as if the Guidelines never
existed. A second possibility is that a district court could also accord the
Guidelines the greatest weight and most deference, similar to the mandatory
Guidelines system. Neither approach is consistent with the intent of the
Court in Booker.2 7  Sentencing courts will thus be challenged to find a
common ground to effect the purposes of sentencing by both drawing on the
original intent of the SRA and developing a "common law" of sentencing.
21. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although the Court eliminated the mandatory nature
of the Guidelines, it did not re-establish the parole system. See id. Paroling authority served as a
safety net for overly harsh sentences and provided an opportunity for prisoners to demonstrate
reforms and rehabilitation looking toward ultimate release from prison. Id.
24. See id. (explaining that the elimination of the mandatory provisions put back in place the
procedures that existed before the creation of the mandatory provisions in 1984).
25. See discussion infra Part IV.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. A "'common law of sentencing' was a fundamental component of the Guidelines model that
hoped to take advantage of 'the interlocking substantive lawmaking competencies of the commission
and the judiciary."' Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a
Jurisprudence that Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 21, 34-
35 (2000) (quoting Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A
Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1441, 1455 (1997)) [hereinafter
Berman, Balanced Departures]. Professor Berman hosts a comprehensive sentencing blog wherein
issues relating to federal sentencing and lower courts' interpretation of Booker are dissected, debated
and discussed. See Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com.
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Part V focuses on the sentencing concepts that were critical under a
mandatory sentencing system and that are now either no longer relevant or
of greatly diminished significance. Concepts such as upward departures,
downward departures, and substantial assistance will not have the same
importance after Booker. This section will suggest why these Guideline-era
concepts no longer apply.
Finally, in Part VI this article takes the position that Booker compels the
lower courts to give full consideration to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),29 which
contains sentencing factors that were virtually ignored under a mandatory
Guidelines structure. 30  This consideration will afford a defendant the
opportunity to seek a departure if the court is inclined to follow the
Guidelines, or to secure a non-Guidelines sentence.3 By doing so, a
sentencing court can defer to the Guidelines structure and at the same time
fashion a sentence that is individualized to each defendant. In this way, the
court will comply with the intent of Congress when it sought to "provide
certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, [while]
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities... [and] maintaining sufficient
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted ....
Moreover, by exercising full discretion and giving full weight to § 3553(a)
factors, the courts will curtail the prosecutorial power that some have argued
has wreaked havoc with the implementation of the Guidelines. 33 This
outcome arguably restores the constitutional balance of power between the
three branches of government.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SENTENCING POLICIES
A. Indeterminate Sentencing
The pre-1980s indeterminate sentencing scheme seems to be a historic
relic when viewed from the perspective of the Guidelines sentencing era.
One of the positive aspects of the traditional indeterminate sentencing
scheme was the individualized structure.34 Sentences were crafted based not
only on the offense but also on the specific characteristics of the defendant's
history.35
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
30. See discussion infra Part IV.
31. Id.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (2000).
33. See discussion infra Part IV.
34. For a general discussion on the sentencing scheme pre-1984, see supra note 28.
35. See id.
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Viewing the case from the bench, a judge had almost boundless
authority to evaluate the prosecution, the defense, and the victim when
imposing a sentence appropriate to the case.36 Sentencing discretion was
virtually unrestrained, as long as the sentence was within the legal range of
the allowable term of months or years set forth by Congress in passing the
statutory scheme or statutory maximum.37 Prior to the Guidelines, there was
virtually no appellate review of district court sentences: appellate courts
accepted the sentence unless it was clearly erroneous.38
Sentencing discretion also existed while the sentence was being served.
During the time the sentence was served, the paroling authority was
available to continually monitor a prisoner's progress and to allow for early
release in cases where it was warranted.39 Prisoners could earn early release
through good behavior or good time credits, demonstrating at least a partial
system-wide rehabilitative process. 40  Finally, the executive pardon,
although rarely used, addressed miscarriages of justice and also injected
some measure of compassion and redemption into the criminal justice
system.4' Thus, discretion and parole were two of the distinct qualities that
characterized an indeterminate sentencing system because they could temper
punishment at the time of the sentencing decision, during the service of
sentence, or even after the sentence was served.42
However, much of the criticism of this unrestrained era was prompted
by inconsistent results. Public sentiment shifted as observers critically
examined this wide, unreviewable discretion enjoyed by the bench.43 The
36. See, e.g., United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81 (1996); see also supra note 28.
37. See Berman, Balanced Departures, supra note 28, at 25 n.3 (indicating that the statutory
maximums and minimums were the only bounds of the trial court's discretion). The term of
imprisonment, up to the statutory maximum, was permissible. See id. Sentence mitigation fell to the
parole authorities to temper the punishment in situations where the prisoner's rehabilitative efforts
warranted early release. See id. at 25.
38. Koon, 518 U.S. at 100. The Koon Court held that the appropriate standard of review for
lower court sentencing was abuse of discretion. Id. Koon was widely viewed as the case giving
judges the widest amount of discretion over sentencing. Berman, Balanced Departures, supra note
28, at 44.
39. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
40. See id.
41. See generally Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections
on the President's Duty to Be Merciful, 27 FORDUAM URB. L.J. 1483 (2000) (discussing the use of
the presidential pardon power).
42. Both discretion and parole were removed in the modem sentencing reform. A pardon could
be granted after a prisoner had served the entire sentence and was released. See discussion infra Part
lI.B.
43. See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 884 (1990).
roots of reform shifted away from a legislative model that allowed for
continued judicial discretion to a much more curtailed presumptive
sentencing system. 4
B. Goals of the Sentencing Reform Act
Sentencing policy in the federal courts underwent a tremendous
upheaval, beginning with the passage of the SRA in 1984, leading to the
establishment of the Sentencing Commission in 1987, and the passage of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, effective that same year.45  This
sentencing reform was motivated by documented unfairness inherent in an
indeterminate sentencing scheme.46 When similarly situated offenders
received punishments that wildly diverged, the interests of justice and
fairness were implicated.47  This seems to be particularly true in a justice
system that is often perceived as skewed against the poor and/or non-
majority defendant. The congressional goal of sentencing reform was to
"move the sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity. That
uniformity does not consist simply of similar sentences for those convicted
of violations of the same statute .... It consists ... of similar relationships
between sentences and real conduct, relationships that Congress' sentencing
statutes helped to advance . . .,4'
The Sentencing Commission was established to develop policies that
"[a]void[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the
establishment of general sentencing practices."'49  The task that the
Commission faced was exceedingly complex, and it recognized "the
difficulty of foreseeing and capturing a single set of guidelines that
44. According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
"[t]he original federal legislation called for advisory guidelines with limited appellate
review. During Senate debates in 1978 however a standard was added requiring that
judges sentence within the prescribed guideline range unless 'the court finds that an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into
consideration by the Commission in formulating the guidelines and that should result in a
different sentence."'
FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 7, at 7.
45. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000).
46. See FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 7, at 1-2 (noting that the growing concern was that this
"therapeutic state" power could pose a danger to liberty and fairness).
47. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 786 (2005) ("The present problem with
disparity in sentencing., stems precisely from the failure of [f]ederal judges-individually and
collectively-to sentence similarly situated defendants in a consistent, reasonable manner.").
48. Id. at 761.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
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encompass[ed] the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a
sentencing decision."5° Precisely because of the wide range of human nature
and the ever expanding federal criminal code, the Commission refused to
"limit the kinds of factors (whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the
guidelines) that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case."'"
The drafters of the Guidelines sought to establish a "common law of
sentencing" with judicial input and reasoned evolution. 2 The Sentencing
Commission's original intent was to develop sentencing policies that would
allow "trial and appellate judges, through their articulation and review of
reasons supporting decisions to depart from the Guidelines in individual
cases, [and] have their say in the evolution of principled and purposeful
sentencing law and policy. 53 Therefore, rather than minimize the courts'
involvement in sentencing, the Commission envisioned courts with a much
greater role in framing sentencing policy over the years through appellate
review. As one observer commented,
[t]he courts would have responsibility, however, for developing a
jurisprudential approach to those occasions in which it is
appropriate to set guideline presumptions aside. The commission,
for its part, would benefit from the ongoing elaboration of such a
common law of sentencing. Over time, the substantive principles
developed by judges could coexist with, or even be incorporated
into, the guidelines themselves. Such a partnership model of shared
institutional powers was thus a core component of the reformist
ideal.54
These sentencing objectives and goals failed to materialize under the
mandatory system that developed after the passage of the SRA.
C. Sentencing Under Mandatory Guidelines
The SRA had the noble goal of eliminating sentencing disparity across
the federal judicial districts and among the judges within a district.
Arguably, what developed was a harsh, rigid set of sentencing rules that
50. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b) (2004)
[hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL].
51. Id.
52. Berman, Balanced Departures, supra note 28, at 34.
53. Id. at 35.
54. Reitz, supra note 28, at 1455.
omitted judicial input and favored executive control. For the last two
decades, criminal sentencing in federal court has been controlled by the
Guidelines." Soon after their passage, the Supreme Court held that the
Guidelines were binding for all sentences in federal court. 6
After 1987, judges lost their broad and unstructured discretion in
crafting appropriate punishments for federal offenders.57 Congress voided
the indeterminate scheme in favor of a determinate sentencing structure.58
With the advent of the mandatory Guidelines, judicial sentencing discretion
in the federal court system virtually evaporated.5 9 Federal judges' dislike of
the Guidelines was widely acknowledged, and is evidenced by the fact that
federal judges retired more quickly under the Guidelines system.60 The
Guidelines reduced all federal sentences to a mathematical grid,61 and,
almost without exception, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ")
predetermined the outcome by the way in which it charged a defendant.
The determinate Guidelines scheme required judges to perform a mechanical
task after conviction by sentencing a defendant from among an astonishing
258 possible categories. 63 However despite the initial reaction, the federal
judiciary became accustomed to the harsh sentencing structure and the new
sentencing concepts such as "relevant conduct," "ranges," and
55. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 391 (1989).
56. See id. (explaining that "the Guidelines bind judges and courts in the exercise of their
uncontested responsibility to pass sentence in criminal cases"); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S.
36, 42 (1993) (noting that "[c]ommentary which functions to 'interpret [a] guideline or explain how
it is to be applied... controls .... ').
57. See discussion supra note 45 and accompanying text.
58. See FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 7, at 7-8.
59. See id. (explaining that the courts were required to place the sentence within the range laid
out by the Guidelines "unless the court fjound] that there exist[ed] an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission .... ").
60. Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions of
Federal Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 231 (2004). The author concluded that "sentencing guidelines
lead judges to take senior status earlier. Specifically, under the sentencing guidelines, district court
judges take senior status 0.4 years after becoming eligible to do so. Without the sentencing
guidelines, district court judges would select senior status 3 years after becoming eligible." Id. at
231.
61. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 50, at ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).
62. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2004:
AN EXPERIMENT THAT HAS FAILED 14-15 (2004) [hereinafter COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS],
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=AILPublications&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.
cfm&ContentFileID=58. For example, the prosecutor had wide discretion to set the amount of loss,
the quantity of drugs, or the scope and participants in a conspiracy. Id. In addition, the prosecutor
could exercise discretion to establish the length of time a conspiracy existed and identify the leaders
and organizers. Id. Each of these factors had significant implications for the ultimate sentence an
offender would receive. Id.
63. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 50, at ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table)
(showing that the federal sentencing Guidelines have a base offense level from 1-43 and a criminal
history range of 1-6, thus producing 258 distinct grids).
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"departures." 64  The Guidelines terminology and parameters framed
sentencing language and methods of evaluation. During the last twenty
years Congress increased control over sentencing by imposing harsher
statutory sentencing schemes and establishing mandatory minimums.65
In 1986, in the midst of these sentencing overhauls, Congress passed the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act which established mandatory minimums of five to
twenty years in prison for a variety of drug-related offenses.66 Sentencing
advocacy plummeted with the addition of mandatory minimums setting a
base line level below which no sentence could fall.67
The combination of mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines
severely restricted the ability of judges to craft discretionary sentences.68 As
an American Bar Association Task Force recently observed:
The effect on sentencing decisions was enormous. Beginning in the
late 1970s, the United States began to respond to concerns about
rising crime by implementing an array of policy changes which, in
the aggregate, produced a steady, dramatic, and unprecedented
increase in the population of the nation's prisons and jails. Between
1974 and 2002, the number of inmates in federal and state prisons
rose from 216,000 to 1,355,748, a more than five-fold increase.
Between 1974 and 2001, the rate of imprisonment rose from 149
inmates to 628 inmates per 100,000 population, a more than four-
fold increase. Jail populations have also increased markedly.
Between 1985 and 2002, the number of persons held in local jails
64. See COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 62, at 9-10, 16.
65. See id. at 2.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000). The statutory minimums bill was expedited in light of the drug
hysteria centered around crack cocaine. See Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug
Prohibition, Politics and Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383,408-11 (1995).
67. See COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 62, at 12-18. Sentencing advocacy plummeted
because the defendant facing sentencing is motivated to assist the government, often to the detriment
of personal advocacy. See id. A defendant may engage in conduct that is detrimental to the defense
position in order to gain a benefit in sentencing. See id. at 15-16 ("It is a common practice that the
government will only allow pleas, on relatively favorable terms, if the defendants agree to forego
those arguments which might lead to downward departures under the existing guidelines
provisions."). Although a defendant can gain from acceptance of responsibility and the possibility of
a substantial assistance notification, the defendant might be better served by fighting the charges and
securing conviction of a lesser charge or an acquittal. See id. Under a guidelines structure, fewer
cases went to trial, and there were harsher and swifter sentences. See generally ABA JUSTICE
KENNEDY COMM'N TASK FORCE REPORT (2004), available at
www.abanet.org/leadership/2004/annual/dailyjournal/121A.doc [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
68. See COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 62, at 12 ("There is even less room for judicial
discretion if a mandatory minimum statute applies.").
more than doubled, from 256,615 to 665,475. By mid-year 2002,
the combined number of inmates in federal and state prisons and
jails exceeded two million.69
Judges have been vocal in their criticism of the Guidelines calling them
"unjust" and "harsh" because of the way they operate in a mandatory
sentencing system: the harshness of the Guidelines leads to unnecessary
punishment in many cases. 70  Further, Justice Kennedy was critical of the
Guidelines because they strip the discretionary authority of judges. 7' He
recently stated that courts should not have to "blindly... follow unjust
guidelines.,
72
Judges resented the fact that the Guidelines removed most of the judicial
discretion and many concerned observers held the view that the Guidelines
system failed to achieve the original goals:7 3 "Efforts to eliminate disparity
in sentencing have resulted in an incursion on the independence of the
federal judiciary, a transfer of power from the judiciary to prosecutors and a
proliferation of unjustifiably harsh individual sentences. 74  The most
obvious result of the Guidelines has been harsher sentences, many with an
adverse racial impact.75 Long prison sentences have become the norm in the
federal system with little diversion to alternative punishment options.76
Essentially, judges simply did not have the flexibility to adjust sentences to
alternative punishments, and instead were directed through the Guidelines
structure to send offenders to prison.
As judicial influence decreased, prosecutorial power grew, producing an
unanticipated power shift.77 In addition, the United States Supreme Court
69. See TASK FORCE, supra note 67, at 16.
70. See, e.g., Rhonda McMillion, Second Effort: ABA Supports Push to Restore Judicial
Discretion in Sentencing, 90 A.B.A. 62 (2004).
71. See TASK FORCE, supra note 67, at 11-13.
72. Hearing on Fiscal Year 2005 Appropriations for the Supreme Court Before the House
Appropriations Comm., 109th Cong. (2004) (Statement of Justice Kennedy); see Gina Holland,
Justice Applauds Bucking Sentencing Law (Mar. 17, 2004), http://news.findlaw.com (Mar. 17, 2004)
(quoting Justice Kennedy's view of the Guidelines).
73. See COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 62, at I (indicating that the Guidelines were
create to promote fairness, but fairness in sentencing requires judicial discretion).
74. Id.
75. See discussion infra notes 258-73 and accompanying text.
76. TASK FORCE, supra note 67, at 16.
77. See COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 62, at 15-17. Prosecutors were in the exclusive
position to identify the target or subject of the inquiry, define the relevant conduct, supervise the
investigation, draft the charges, prosecute the case, and offer the potential for special sentencing
considerations such as bargaining or substantial assistance. See id. at 13-17. While most of these
functions were the traditional prerogative of the executive, the judiciary always had the power to
check executive abuses by imposing tempered punishments. Id. at 5. Moreover, the paroling
authority maintained the prerogative to release prisoners at some point when they had demonstrated
a degree of rehabilitation. See id. at 13-17. Because the majority of criminal offenses in a
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refined its interpretation of the limits of judicial discretion in a series of
cases, beginning, most notably, with the decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey."5 Apprendi restricted the basis upon which a court could sentence a
defendant to only those facts found by a jury. 79 Apprendi found a Sixth
Amendment violation where the sentence was based on judicially found
facts rather than facts supported by a jury verdict.8° The holding in Apprendi
was limited to sentencing within a statutory maximum and courts could no
longer find additional facts outside of the jury's verdict on which to base a
sentence.
As the Supreme Court was defining the precise intersection between the
Sixth Amendment and sentencing policy, the Blakely v. Washington case
arose.82  Blakely was a bombshell in sentencing jurisprudence. Robert
Blakely had entered a guilty plea to second degree kidnapping in an
agreement with the State of Washington.83 In exchange, he was subject to a
ten-year statutory maximum, with a sentencing guidelines range of forty-
nine to fifty-three months, also by statutory enactment.84 When the court
heard the horrific details of the kidnapping, the judge rejected the plea
agreement and sentenced Blakely to 90 months.85
The Blakely Court extended the holding of Apprendi to apply to any fact
that increased a sentence beyond that found by a jury or admitted by a
mandatory Guidelines system are resolved through pleas, the government controlled the outcome by
coupling the charges with the anticipated sentence to achieve a desired result. Id.
78. 530 U.S. 466 (2000); see also discussion infra Part I11.
79. Id. at 467-77.
80. Id. at 490.
81. Id.
82. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Blakely was charged with two counts of first-
degree kidnapping but he entered into a plea arrangement with the government to plead guilty to
second-degree kidnapping. Id. at 298-99. Under Washington law, the more serious kidnapping
offense was categorized as a Class B offense with a ten year maximum penalty. Id. at 299. The
state of Washington established a sentencing range for second-degree kidnapping offense of forty-
nine to fifty-three months by statutory enactment. Id. at 299-300. The prosecutor agreed to
recommend a sentence within this standard range and the defendant entered a plea of guilty. Id. at
298-99.
The sentencing court held a post-conviction sentencing hearing and listened to the wife's
description of the ordeal. Id. at 300. The Court then rejected the plea recommendation and found,
by a preponderance of evidence, that the defendant acted with "deliberate cruelty" and imposed an
exceptional sentence of ninety months, significantly longer than the maximum permitted under the
standard range to which the defendant agreed pursuant to the plea agreement. Id.
83. Id. at 298-99.
84. Id. at 299-300.
85. Id.
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defendant.16  Blakely thus impacted all sentences within a mandatory
Guidelines system, although the Court held that the decision did not apply to
the federal Guidelines.17 In clarifying Apprendi, Blakely ruled that a court
cannot sentence a defendant by reference to enhancing facts that were not
piesented to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt: to do so would be
to violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.8 8 Ultimately, Blakely
spawned Booker.89
III. THE BOOKER AND FANFAN CASES
A. Dual Opinions
In the companion cases of Booker and Fanfan, the Supreme Court
issued an unusual dual decision.90 Both opinions were decided by a five-to-
four vote.91 Only Justice Ginsburg joined both majorities.92 In Booker, the
Court found the federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional because they
permitted a sentencing judge to impose a sentence based on facts found by a
judge, not a jury.93 This aspect of the holding is a natural extension of the
Blakely holding applied to the Federal Guidelines. Under the Court's
interpretation of the Guidelines, the sentence could not exceed that
authorized by the jury findings or it would be in violation of the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to have all facts proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.94 The decisions were unique in that there were dual
majorities: 95 Justice Stevens issued an opinion in which he reviewed the
merits of the constitutional challenge to the Sentencing Guidelines and
found that the Guidelines were unconstitutional; 96 Justice Breyer announced
the remedy to be imposed in light of the constitutional violation announced
in the companion opinion.9 7 Freddie Booker benefited from the Court's
86. Id. at 305.
87. Id. at 305 n.9.
88. Id. at 305.
89. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 745.
92. Id. The substantive opinion was written by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter,
Thomas and Ginsburg. Id. The remedial opinion was written by Justice Breyer, joined by
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy and Ginsburg. Id. The coalitions were further divided by the six
other concurring and dissenting opinions filed by eight out of the nine Justices. Id.
93. Id. at 746.
94. Id. at 756
95. Id. at 746.
96. Id. at 746-56.
97. Id. at 756-69.
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substantive opinion;98 Ducan Fanfan benefited from the Court's remedial
opinion.99 In both cases the defendants were entitled to re-sentencing based
on an advisory Guidelines system.'00
1. Freddie Booker
Freddie Booker was convicted of dealing drugs and of possession with
intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine.' As a result, under
the Guidelines he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in
federal prison.
10 2
Because of Booker's criminal history and offense level, his sentence fell
within a range of 210-262 months, roughly double the mandatory
minimum.'0 3 At Booker's sentencing hearing, the judge found additional
facts by a preponderance of the evidence, as he was entitled to do under the
Guidelines structure.1 °4 The judge found factual support for an additional
566 grams of crack cocaine, increasing Booker's Guidelines range to 360
months to life.'0 5 The sentencing judge followed the Guidelines, evaluated
the "relevant conduct," and imposed a sentence of thirty years. 0 6 These
additional facts were not found by the jury.'0 7 The judge concluded that the
mandatory nature of the Guidelines required that the sentence be increased
to accommodate this additional information.'08 Booker argued that this
additional fact finding was violative of the Court's decision in Blakely since
none of the facts were found beyond a reasonable doubt.'0 9 As a result,
Booker's sentence blurred the fact-finding role of the judge and the jury in
violation of the Sixth Amendment.
98. Id. at 769.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 769.
101. Id. at 746.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The relevant conduct was determined by examining the underlying criminal conduct and
factoring this conduct into the sentence range. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 510 (7th Cir. 2004).
629
2. Ducan Fanfan
Ducan Fanfan had a different sentencing problem. He was also a drug
dealer convicted of conspiracy to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine.' 10
The guilty verdict supported the quantity of 500 grams.' Under the
Guidelines, his sentence range was 63-78 months." 12  At sentencing, the
judge found additional facts 13 as relevant conduct which could triple
Fanfan's sentence to 188-235 months." 4  Fanfan's judge anticipated the
impact of Blakely on the Guidelines and declined to sentence under the
enhanced Guidelines range." 5  The judge read the Blakely decision to
preclude him from enhancing Fanfan's sentence above the range based
solely on the jury verdict. 1 6 Thus, Fanfan was sentenced to seventy-eight
months.' 17
Fanfan's sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment, since the facts
supporting his sentence were found by a jury." 8  Even though Fanfan's
judge relied only on facts found by the jury, the sentence was struck down
since the sentencing judge applied the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion
using § 3553(b)(1). " 9 The Fanfan sentencing judge determined that the
sentence violated the Booker holding because it was based on the section
that made the Guidelines mandatory, a section that Booker excised from the
operation of the Guidelines. 20
110. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747.
111. Id.
112. United States v. Fanfan, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114, at *2 (D. Me. June 28, 2004).
113. The sentencing judge also found that Fanfan was an organizer and leader of the criminal
activity and responsible for an additional 2.5 kilos of cocaine and 261.6 grams of crack. Booker, 125
S. Ct. at 747.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 747.
116. Id.
117. Fanfan, 2004WL 1723114, at *5.
118. Id.
119. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769. After Booker, many courts continue to afford the Guidelines
presumptive weight in the district court and a presumption of reasonableness on appeal. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah 2005) (presumptive weight);, United States
v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2005) (presumption of reasonableness); United States v.
Lincoln, 413 F. 3d 716 (8th Cir. 2005) (presumption of reasonableness); United States v. Green, No.
05-4270, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 2833, at *15 (4th Cir. Feb. 6, 2006) ("In this area, the district court
is given some latitude to tailor a particular sentence to the circumstances without discarding the
overarching guidelines and policies. But we agree with the Seventh Circuit, which has concluded
that a sentence imposed 'within the properly calculated Guidelines range... is presumptively
reasonable."') (quoting United States v. Newsom, 428 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2005)); United States
v. Williams, No. 05-5416 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006) ("We now join several sister circuits in crediting
sentences properly calculated under the Guidelines with a rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness. Such a presumption comports with the Supreme Court's remedial decision in
Booker.").
120. Id.
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B. Substantive Opinion
Justice Stevens's substantive result in Booker flowed expectedly from
the string of Supreme Court sentencing cases that had focused on the Sixth
Amendment.' Connecting the range of sentencing options to facts found
by a judge effectively altered the balance of power between the judge and
the jury, implicating the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.' In each of
those prior decisions, the Court expanded the reach of the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial clause. 23
In Jones v. United States,124 the Court examined the federal carjacking
statute and determined that the statute actually delineated three distinct
offenses based on the extent of harm to the victim.'25 The Court concluded
that harm to the victim was really an element of the crime because its
determination raised the punishment ceiling. 126 As a result, the extent of
harm must be charged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
2 7
Apprendi v. New Jersey12  focused on the maximum sentence
established by statute. Apprendi held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."'2 9
In a death penalty case, Ring v. Arizona,30 the Court stated that capital
punishment defendants are also entitled to a jury determination of "any fact
on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum
punishment.' 3 1  Finally, in Blakely v. Washington,3 2 the immediate
121. See discussion infra notes 124-141.
122. See U.S. CONST. amend VI (stating that the defendant has the right to a trial by an "impartial
jury.").
123. See discussion infra notes 124-141.
124. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
125. Id. at 229-30.
126. Id. at 251 n. 11.
127. Id. at251-52.
128. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
129. Id. Although Apprendi caused trepidations among practitioners and academics alike when it
was decided, in its aftermath the Federal Guidelines appeared to be insulated from attack since
Apprendi dealt with sentencing above a statutory maximum. See Eric C. Hallstrom, State v.
Grossman: The Minnesota Supreme Court Applies Apprendi to Minnesota 's Patterned Sex Offender
Statute but What Lies Ahead?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 411 (2002). In the four years between
Apprendi and Blakely, the actual impact of Apprendi was rather modest. Many of the errors caused
by the interpretation of Apprendi were excused under the more generous plain error standard. See
John Kenneth Zwerling, Comprendez Apprendi?, 30 AM. CRAM. L. REV. 309, 315-17 (2001).
130. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
131. Id. at 589.
precursor to Booker, the Court extended the Apprendi holding to those
enhancements that are set by the Guidelines' range, not only the legislatively
set statutory maximum. 1
33
Justice Stevens's substantive opinion in Booker adjudicated the merits
of the Sixth Amendment constitutional challenge.134 This majority opinion
concluded that the mandatory nature of the federal sentencing Guidelines
compels their failure. 135  The mandatory Guidelines allow no vehicle for a
defendant to have the foundational punishment facts determined by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. 136 Consequently, Justice Stevens found that the
Guidelines were in violation of the Sixth Amendment.1
37
Many observers recognized the inevitable outcome: the Court would
have to find the Guidelines violative of the Sixth Amendment in the wake of
Blakely. 13 1 One judge expressed the view that "Blakely dooms the
guidelines insofar as they require that sentences be based on facts found by a
judge."'39 Blakely cast serious doubt on the viability of the Guidelines, as
courts interpreting Blakely have so found. 140 In fact, many lower courts did
not wait for the Booker opinion to invalidate the Guidelines."'
132. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304-07 (2004).
133. Id. at 309-3 10.
134. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005).
135. Id. at 764.
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)-(b) (2000) (stating that, according to the Guidelines, the court
"shall" impose a particular sentence if the court itself, and not the jury, determines that certain facts
exist).
137. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
138. "If the Washington scheme does not comport with the constitution, it is hard to imagine a
Guidelines scheme that would." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 326 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2004).
140. See United States v. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (noting the
differences between the guidelines in Blakely and the Federal Guidelines made the Federal
Guidelines more vulnerable to a constitutional attack); United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d
79, 82 (D. Mass. 2004) (concluding that Blakely applied to the Federal Guidelines and "that the
Guidelines [were] rendered unconstitutional in their entirety by that application."); United States v.
Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1238 (D. Utah 2004) (stating that "the inescapable conclusion of
Blakely is that the Federal Guidelines have been rendered unconstitutional in cases such as this
one."); United States v. Schaefer, 384 F.3d 326, 331 (7th Cir. 2004) (beginning its discussion of the
case with a review of the Blakely decision, and stating that "the constitutional validity of the
Guidelines is in doubt.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit courts declared the Guidelines unconstitutional
before the Supreme Court's decision in Booker. See, e.g., United States v. Mooney, 401 F.3d 940
(8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Montgomery, 2004 WL 1562904 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir.
2004). Other circuits found the Guidelines to be consistent with the Constitution. See, e.g., United
States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hammoud, 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir.
2004); United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004).
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C. Remedial Opinion
Although many anticipated that the Court would have to revert to an
advisory system in light of the Blakely and Apprendi decisions, the surprise
segment of the Booker opinion was the excision of two sections of the
Guidelines. 4 2 Once the Court determined the aspect of the Guidelines that
implicated the Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant, it excised the
unconstitutional portions of the Guidelines and retained the essence of what
makes the Guidelines a viable punishment tool. 4 3 The Court determined
that implementation of the substantive opinion required the excision of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (providing that courts "shall" impose a Guidelines
sentence)'" and § 3742(e) (setting forth standards of appellate review), 45
both of which were "incompatible with today's constitutional holding."'
' 46
Since § 3553(b)(1) was the provision that made the Guidelines mandatory,
without it the Guidelines became advisory in all future cases.
Notably, the excision was done with the goal of preserving the entirety
of the remainder of the SRA: "The remainder of the Act 'function[s]
independently."",147  The Court was explicit: "Section 3553(a) remains in
effect, and sets forth numerous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors
in turn will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining
whether a sentence is unreasonable.' 48
142. Speaking for the Blakely dissenters, Justice O'Connor observed that:
[t]he consequences of today's decision will be as far reaching as they are disturbing.
Washington's sentencing system is by no means unique. Numerous other States have
enacted Guidelines systems, as has the Federal Government. Today's decision casts
constitutional doubt over them all and, in so doing, threatens an untold number of
criminal judgments. Every sentence imposed under such Guidelines in cases currently
pending on direct appeal is in jeopardy. And despite the fact that we hold in Schriro v.
Summerlin ... that Ring... does not apply retroactively on habeas review, all criminal
sentences imposed under the federal and state guidelines since Apprendi was decided in
2000 arguably remain open to collateral attack.
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 323-24 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
143. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756-57 (2005).
144. Id. at 756. Section 3553(b)(1) states that courts "shall impose a sentence.., within the
range." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
145. Section 3742(e) provides for a de novo standard of review which is dependant on "the
Guidelines' mandatory nature." 18 U.S.C.S. § 3742(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005). This provision
came about after the enactment of the PROTECT Act in 2003. This law revised the standard for
appellate review, and it has been declared invalid by the Booker decision. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
146. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
147. Id. at 764 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
148. Id. at 766.
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The use of § 3553(a) as a guide has taken center stage in the immediate
future of federal sentencing. 149  There are two possible extremes: heavy
deference and guideline avoidance. On the one hand, the courts can afford
the Guidelines the heaviest deference, adhering closely to the Guidelines as
though they are still mandatory "in all but the most exceptional cases."' °
On the other hand, courts might celebrate in the advisory nature of the
Guidelines, intending to avoid them at all costs and sentence according to
individual whim.1 5' Either interpretation is a violation of the spirit and
holding of Booker.
IV. DEFINING REASONABLENESS
As indicated, in fixing the Blakely problem, the Booker Court was
determined to retain the essence of the Guidelines as advisory while
eliminating the mandatory obligations. In rectifying the constitutional
infirmity, the Court assigned the appellate courts the duty of reviewing
sentences for reasonableness. 52 One possible reaction to this holding is the
anticipation of a return to the pre-Guidelines discrepancies in sentencing,
including the return of unwarranted disparities. Alternatively, opponents of
an advisory guidelines system might perceive that this system is inherently
inferior to a presumptive or mandatory system. 5 3  Neither of these
expectations need be true. In fact, since the Booker decision, most appellate
courts have upheld sentences for "reasonableness," as discussed below.
149. See discussion infra Part V.
150. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 925 (D. Utah 2005).
151. One court coined this approach "the free at last" view: a return to pre-1984 indeterminate
sentencing. United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 370 (D. Mass. 2005). It is an approach "in
which judges feel free to disagree about the fundamental premises of sentencing, to implement their
own perceptions of what policies should drive punishment." Id.
152. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765.
153. Legal observers have expressed "concerns from proponents of prescriptive guidelines and
from opponents of guidelines generally that advisory systems were ineffective or more trouble than
they were worth. These concerns were based on a perception of the superior effects of prescriptive
systems and of the inferior outcomes ofadvisory ones." Kim S. Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory
Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 233, 2005 WL 2922198, at *2 (2005).
The authors compare the federal system to state advisory sentencing schemes and conclude that the
advisory system can be an effective sentencing tool:
Although some commentators have questioned the efficacy of advisory systems in
addressing sentencing disparity and predictability, this article will show that, properly
constituted and overseen, these systems have produced results in many ways comparable
to those of prescriptive sentencing systems, which themselves have not always achieved
or sustained the ambitious goals they have set.
Id. at * 1.
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A. Reasonableness
The Supreme Court replaced the mandatory Guidelines with a more
flexible approach to punishment: a "practical standard of review already
familiar to appellate courts: review for 'unreasonable[ness].' '1 54  The
"reasonableness" of a sentence will be the determining factor in future cases,
and appellate courts will have to guide the way in this new era of post-
Booker sentencing. The reasonableness standard of review seeks to
determine whether a lower court imposed a sentence "sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes" of § 3553(a)(2). 155
Reasonableness is a sufficiently flexible standard that will allow a court to
sentence within the Guidelines or depart when warranted.
Reasonableness, the heart of all future sentencing,' 5 6 "requires a
sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges ... but it permits the court to
tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.'
' 57
Specifically, the Booker Court stated:
Without the "mandatory" provision, the Act nonetheless requires
judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other
sentencing goals. ... The Act. . . requires judges to consider the
Guidelines "sentencing range established for ... the applicable
category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant,"... the pertinent Sentencing Commission policy
statements, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities,
and the need to provide restitution to victims .... And the Act...
requires judges to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of
the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment,
afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and effectively
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training and medical care.' 5 8
The fact that reasonableness will govern sentencing does not mean that the
Guidelines will no longer be relevant or influential over the judiciary.
154. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994)).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
156. Sentencing is likely to evolve once again should Congress take the invitation of the Court to
act on this decision. See id. at 768 (indicating that the "ball now lies in Congress' court.").
157. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and 28 U.S.C. § 991).
158. Id. at 764-65 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. West, 383 F. Supp. 2d
517, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Nothing in Booker appears to suggest that such fact-finding, as limited
by the principles of Apprendi and its progeny, is inappropriate.").
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Rather, courts will be able to craft a sentence that achieves the goals of the
SRA whether the sentence imposed is within, or outside of. the
Guidelines.159 Rote sentencing has therefore been eliminated.
Once judicial fact-determinations are omitted, the judge must rely on
other discretionary factors in order to craft a reasonable sentence:
We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad
discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range.... For
when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific
sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury
determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.160
So, it appears that a judge can avoid a Sixth Amendment violation by
exercising genuine sentencing discretion. Even though the Guidelines are
now advisory, courts must still consult the Guidelines when assessing the
appropriate sentence to be imposed. 16' According to the Booker Court, the
"district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those
Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing."'
162
The correct determination of what is and is not reasonable will be the
challenge for courts in the immediate future as they attempt to comply with
Booker's limitations, while at the same time exercising more sentencing
discretion than they have had since 1984.163 Some courts have decreed that
they will give "serious" consideration to the Guideline ranges when
sentencing.' 64 Regardless of the amount of deference a court gives to the
Guidelines, the court should create a record that supports the sentence
imposed. 1
65
Other post-Booker decisions have "considered" the Guidelines when
sentencing even though the ultimate sentence is outside of the sentencing
range. 166 There is a danger that courts will offer a passing reference to the
159. Courts will be able to calculate "more severe or more lenient sentence[s]" after considering
the Guidelines range. United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 767 (2005)).
160. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750.
161. Id. at 767.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 765-66 (indicating that Booker established the reasonableness standard of review
for the final sentence).
164. United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985 (E.D. Wis. 2005). The court also warned
that "Booker is not.., an invitation to do business as usual." Id. at 987.
165. "We first review decisions of the district court regarding Guideline calculations to ensure that
the district court calculated the Guideline range correctly." United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d
1241, 1245 (11 th Cir. 2005). The sentencing court's explanation of the sentence imposed will allow
the appellate court to adequately consider the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.
166. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 119 (2d Cir. 2005). The Crosby court was the first to
evaluate the Booker decision for the Second Circuit. See generally id. The court attempted to
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Guidelines in order to be deemed to have considered them, but without true
meaningful reference. 67 Courts that carefully consider both the Guidelines
and the individual circumstances of the defendant and the crime will likely
be able to withstand appellate scrutiny of the sentence imposed.168 There is
a strong likelihood that a punishment which considers but does not
mechanically apply all of the factors that were eliminated by the mandatory
guidelines system will better reflect justice than the rote sentences that
preceded Booker.
1. "Great Weight" and Presumption of Reasonableness
In United States v. Wilson, 16 9 the court afforded the Guidelines "heavy
weight,"' 70 and suggested that deviation from the Guidelines could occur
only "in unusual cases for clearly identified and persuasive reasons.' 7' This
view is bolstered by the language in Booker that "[tihe district courts, while
not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take
them into account when sentencing."' 72 However, taking a position that the
Guidelines are presumed valid is flawed and arguably a constitutional
violation of the Booker holding. A sentence that automatically adheres to
the Guidelines except in exceptional cases is quite likely per se
unreasonable.
provide general guidance to the lower courts of the circuit, but it declined to define "consideration,"
instead leaving this interpretation to evolve in future sentencing. See generally id.
167. Id. at 11l. The judge noted that a court cannot satisfy its duty to consider the Guidelines by a
generic reference to them when sentencing. Id.
168. Courts should not speculate what a lower court would likely do, since the sentencing
framework is now different. See discussion supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text. Courts that
are considering whether to re-sentence a defendant who was sentenced in the interim between
Blakely and Booker will most likely have to sentence anew. Both the defendant and the government
should be given the opportunity to present all relevant sentencing factors to the court. An appellate
judge would be challenged to discem what sentence a district judge "would have imposed.., in the
absence of mandatory Guidelines and de novo review of downward departures." United States v.
Ruiz-Alonso, 397 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 2005). Another court put it this way: "[the] fundamental
difference between the pre- and post-Booker sentencing frameworks illustrates our deep concern
with speculating, based merely on a middle-of-the-range sentence imposed under the mandatory
Guidelines framework, that the district court would not have sentenced [the defendant] to a lower
sentence under the advisory Guidelines regime." United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 528 (6th
Cir. 2005).
169. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005). The decision in Wilson was
reaffirmed, and its critics addressed, in United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah
2005).
170. Id. at 912.
171. Id. at 925.
172. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 767 (2005) (emphasis added).
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The flaw with the reasoning advanced by the Wilson court is that the
Guidelines were never meant to be blindly followed. Congress and the
Commission envisioned a true advisory role for the Guidelines.1 3 It was
anticipated that a common law of sentencing would develop with the lower
and appellate courts refining what worked and what failed. 74 The SRA at
its inception contemplated incorporation of § 3553(a) factors to individualize
sentences. 175 Instead, sentencing has evolved with robotic calculation, a
result not advanced or expected by the SRA.
Heavy deference to the Guidelines without more does nothing to
recognize the reasoning and holding of Booker and the cases that led to its
opinion. Affording great weight to the Guidelines continues to treat them as
if their mandatory status survived Booker. The Wilson approach is in
conflict with the directives of Booker, as Justice Scalia explains in his
dissent:
Thus, logic compels the conclusion that the sentencing judge, after
considering the recited factors (including the Guidelines), has full
discretion, as full as what he possessed before the Act was passed,
to sentence anywhere within the statutory range. If the majority
thought otherwise-if it thought the Guidelines not only had to be
"considered" (as the amputated statute requires) but had generally to
be followed-its opinion would surely say SO.176
This deferential approach runs counter to the holding in Booker, which
specifically rendered the Guidelines advisory. 177  Rather than continue to
support the much criticized Guidelines, Booker carved a new path by
resurrecting discretion and urging courts to "consider" but not defer to the
Guidelines when sentencing. 7' This approach allows a court to address all,
not just some, of the goals of the SRA.
Justice Scalia asserted that reasonableness review "requires courts of
appeals to evaluate each sentence individually for reasonableness, rather
than apply the cookie-cutter standards of the mandatory Guidelines.' ' 179 It
appears that approximately half of the circuit courts have adopted a
presumption of reasonableness when the sentence imposed is within the
173. See discussion supra note 18 and accompanying text.
174. See discussion supra note 28.
175. See generally discussion supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text; supra notes 147-48 and
accompanying text.
176. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 791 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 767.
178. See discussion supra Part IV A.
179. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 794 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Guidelines range. 18  This approach treats a Guidelines sentence as
presumptively reasonable and shelters the sentence from appellate review, at
least in those circuits adhering to this interpretation of Booker. 181
2. Ignoring the Guidelines
The fact that the Guidelines are now advisory rather than mandatory
presents problems for courts that had serious disagreement with the
Guidelines' implementation. Courts are now permitted to exercise judicial
discretion and consider the Guidelines, but they must also tailor a sentence
with the policies and purposes of the SRA in mind.' 82  Some jurists have
voiced concerns that courts might ignore the Guidelines and the sentence
that results would thus not be bound by reason and thus not be "reasonable":
If one does not give the Guidelines "deference," "considerable
weight," a "presumption of correctness," or some similar
significance, what does one do to harmonize and implement the
vaunted statutory goals of sentencing that Judge Pratt and others
use, cafeteria style, to do justice? If one reads the decisions of
judges who give the Guidelines and their ranges no particular
significance ("weight"), one is, sadly, left with the conclusion that
180. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, No. 05-1260, 2006 FED App. 0059P (6th Cir. Feb.
13, 2006) ("Even when selecting a presumptively reasonable sentence within the Guidelines range, a
district court must 'articulate[] its reasoning sufficiently to permit reasonable appellate review,
specifying its reasons for selecting" the specific sentence within that range") (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Williams, No. 05-5416, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *2 (Jan. 31, 2006));
United States v. Green, No. 05-4270, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 2833, at *15 (4th Cir. Feb. 6, 2006)
("But we agree with the Seventh Circuit, which has concluded that a sentence imposed 'within the
properly calculated Guidelines range ... is presumptively reasonable."') (quoting United States v.
Newsom, 428 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2005)); United States v. Kristl, No. 05-1067, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3817, at *8 (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 2006) ("[W]e join our sister circuits and hold that a sentence
that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness. This is a deferential standard that either the defendant or the government may rebut
by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when viewed against the other factors delineated
in § 3553(a) .... ); United States v. Smith, No. 05-30313, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *9 (5th Cir.
Feb 17, 2006) (A non-Guideline sentence unreasonably fails to reflect the statutory sentencing
factors where it (1) does not account for a factor that should have received significant weight, (2)
gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or (3) represents a clear error of
judgment in balancing the sentencing factors.").
181. See, e.g., United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a sentence
within the Guidelines range was presumptively reasonable); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F. 3d
606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that "any sentence that is properly calculated under the
Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.").
182. See discussion supra Part 1I.B; see also discussion supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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well-meaning sentences are now being imposed with little or no
coherent organizing principles. One day it may be deterrence
(general or specific). Another day it might be "just punishment"
that catches our fancy. On the third day we may be seen as
promoting "respect for the law." Of course, we never want a
sentence longer than necessary. And so on, and so on. We end up
selecting the sentencing goal(s) of the day (and thus the sentence of
the moment) with much the same whimsy and lack of coherence as
children picking the flavor of the day at the ice cream shop. 8 3
Courts should not read Booker to suggest they can virtually ignore the
Guidelines and return to a time of absolute discretion in sentencing. This
perspective would also violate the Booker deeision, which left intact the
majority of the Guidelines provisions.' 84  For one thing, such an
abandonment of the Guidelines would resurrect some of the very pitfalls that
resulted in the passage of the SRA initially, such as discrepancies and lack
of uniformity in sentencing. One court has cautioned that courts should not
view Booker as a return to the "'free at last' regime, or a return to pre-1984
indeterminate sentencing. ' 85  Judges who are inclined to disregard the
Guidelines might do so in order to favor their own personal agenda of the
policies and goals supporting sentencing, a result not contemplated by
Booker.
Despite the practical reality that the Guidelines are no longer mandatory,
no circuit court, thus far, has found that a sentence within the Guidelines was
unreasonable. The Ninth Circuit has issued an amended opinion that deleted
a footnote which read, "We also note that, on appellate review, a sentence
suggested by the guidelines is presumptively reasonable."' 18 6  As one
sentencing scholar noted, "it seems the circuit courts are creating de facto
through reasonableness review a kind of post-Booker mandatory 'minimum
guideline system. '
' '181
183. United States v. Wanning, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061-62 (D. Neb. 2005). This view was
expressed by Judge Kopf, who cautioned his colleagues against giving their own idiosyncratic sense
ofjustice. Id.
184. See discussion supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
185. United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 370 (D. Mass. 2005).
186. United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez, No. 05-30066, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 1176, at *3 n.1
(9th Cir. Jan, 19, 2006). In its first issued opinion, the court expressed the statement that a within-
guideline sentence was reasonable. Id. A subsequently issued opinion omitted this language.
United States v. Gurerrero-Velasquez, No. 05-30066, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 2908, at *1 (9th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2006).
187. Douglas A. Berman, The Ugly Look of Reasonableness Review, SENTENCING LAW AND
POLICY, Feb. 3, 2006,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/2006/02/the uglyjook-o.html
[hereinafter Berman, Reasonableness Review]. Professor Berman argues that the courts are
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3. "Consideration"
The question of what "consideration" a court should give to the
Guidelines arose in United States v. Crosby5 8  The Court stated that
sentencing courts are "entitled to find all of the facts that the Guidelines
make relevant to the determination of a Guidelines sentence and all of the
facts relevant to the determination of a non-Guidelines sentence."'' 89 The
Crosby court declined to fashion a bright-line rule, such as that announced in
Wilson.'9" Rather, Crosby stated that lower courts should "consider" the
Guidelines when sentencing a defendant. 9' The court welcomed the
"concept of 'consideration' in the context of the applicable Guidelines range
[and it will] evolve as district judges faithfully perform their statutory
duties." 192 As the Crosby court noted, "a sentencing judge would violate the
Sixth Amendment by making factual findings and mandatorily enhancing a
sentence above the range applicable to facts found by a jury or admitted by a
defendant."' 93  The extent to which a lower court will "consider" the
Guidelines is directly connected with the imposition of "reasonable"
sentences.
94
A well-reasoned approach to the post-Booker sentencing process is
displayed in the case of United States v. Ranum,'9g where the court aligned
the remedial majority of Booker to the factors set forth in § 3553(a). The
court recognized that serious consideration must be afforded to the
Guidelines, but cautioned that "in so doing courts should not follow the old
'departure' methodology.' ' 196 Rather,
[courts] need not justify a sentence outside of [the Guidelines] by
citing factors that take the case outside the 'heartland.' Rather,
affording a presumption of legitimacy to sentences set within the guidelines, thus circumventing the
import of Booker and reverting to the Guidelines sentencing standards. Id.
188. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005).
189. Id. at 112.
190. See United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 925 (2005). Other courts have also
declined to follow a bright-line rule. See, e.g., United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1246
(11 th Cir. 2005) ("The government urges us to hold that sentences within the Guideline range are per
se reasonable, but we need not address whether or how much deference is owed sentences within the
applicable Guideline range to determine that Winingear's sentence was reasonable.").
191. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 114.
194. Id. at 119; see discussion supra Part IV.A.
195. United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985-87 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
196. Id. at 987.
courts are free to disagree, in individual cases and in the exercise of
discretion, with the actual range proposed by the guidelines, so long
as the ultimate sentence is reasonable and carefully supported by
reasons tied to the § 3553(a) factors.' 97
This court noted that the Wilson approach was inconsistent with the remedial
Booker majority opinion, which "direct[s] courts to consider all of the §
3553(a) factors, many of which the guidelines either reject or ignore."' 98
Another court has taken a logistical approach to the § 3553 factors:
First, the court must consider the specifics of the case before it-the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant. Second, the court must consider
the facts of the case in light of the purposes of sentencing and the
needs of the public. Third, the court must translate its findings and
impressions into a numerical sentence. In doing so, the court must
consider the kinds of sentences available, the sentencing range
established by the Sentencing Commission, any pertinent policy
statements issued by the Commission, and any restitution due the
victims of the offense. In imposing a specific sentence, the court
must also avoid unwarranted sentence disparities .... The statute
ultimately directs the court, after considering all of the above
circumstances, to impose a sentence sufficient but not greater than
necessary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing identified in §3553(a)(2).'199
The Sixth Circuit discussed reasonableness in the context of the
sentencing requirements of § 3553(a). In United States v. Foreman, the
court stated, "[i]t is worth noting that a district court's job is not to impose a
'reasonable' sentence. Rather, a district court's mandate is to impose 'a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes' of § 3553(a)(2). Reasonableness is the appellate standard of
review in judging whether a district court has accomplished its task., 200
B. How Advisory are the Guidelines?
The Guidelines are now only one factor (number three) on a list of five
possible factors for courts to consider when sentencing. 201 These factors will
197. Id.
198. Id. at 986.
199. United States v. Alexander, 381 F. Supp. 2d 884, 885 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
200. United States v. Foreman, No. 04-2450, 2006 FED App. 0049P, at *15 n.1 (6th Cir. Feb. 8,
2006)
201. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3) (2000).
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guide lower courts as they consider whether a sentence is reasonable.0 2
Courts must consider all of the factors listed in section 3553(a), which
include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(3) the kinds of sentence available;
(5) the Guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission, including the advisory guidelines range;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity; and
(7) the need to provide restitution where applicable.2 3
Courts must not slide easily back into a posture that any sentence within the
Guidelines is presumed to be reasonable, while any sentence outside of the
Guidelines is presumed to be unreasonable. Thus, one court warned, "[t]o
treat the Guidelines as presumptive is to concede the converse, i.e., that any
sentence imposed outside the Guidelines range would be presumptively
unreasonable in the absence of clearly identified reasons... [and] making
the Guidelines, in effect, still mandatory. ' ' 204  To assign presumptive
reasonableness to post-Booker sentencing simply because it follows the
advisory guidelines would be a misreading of the Booker rationale. The
Guidelines should be a "useful starting point in fashioning a just and
202. See United States v. Booker, 543 S. Ct. 738, 766 (2005) ("Section 3553(a) remains in effect,
and sets forth numerous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate
courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.").
203. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(5)-(7). Section 3553(a)(2) sets forth the purposes of
sentencing and contains overriding principles governing all sentences. See discussion infra Part V.
Section (a)(2) factors identify the purposes of punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation. See discussion infra Part V.
204. United States v. Myers, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1028 (S.D. Iowa 2005). The Court also
observed that Booker is "an invitation, not to unmoored decision making, but to the type of careful
analysis of the evidence that should be considered when depriving a person of his or her liberty." Id.
appropriate sentence," but need not dictate the sentence actually imposed: 205
"Booker is not an invitation to do business as usual. 20 6
On the other hand, some courts may want to view the Guidelines as
dismantling all that preceded their enactment. Courts that take the position
that the Guidelines have been tossed aside in favor of a completely
discretionary sentencing scheme are equally misguided. Booker does not
mean a "regime without rules, or a return to the standardless sentencing
which preceded the SRA. 2 °7 Courts can be informed by the Guidelines and
all of their history, and should still "consider" the Guidelines when imposing
a sentence.20 8 The amount of consideration required remains to be worked
out through a flexible use of the now advisory Guidelines in setting a
sentence. Moreover, because of the need to control sentencing disparities,
meaningful appellate review is now more critical than ever. There should be
no presumption that a sentence within the Guidelines is reasonable any more
than there should be a presumption that a sentence outside of the Guidelines
is unreasonable. Consideration of the Guidelines will allow courts to craft
sentences by reference to the Guidelines scheme without being bound by it:
Since there were no alternative rules prior to the Sentencing
Guidelines-no empirical studies linking particular sentences to
particular crime control objectives, no common law of sentencing-
and there have been none since, the Guidelines will continue to
have a critical impact .... [T]he only way for courts to truly
"consider" the Guidelines, rather than to follow them by rote, is to
do in each case just what the Commission failed to do--to explain,
correlate to the purposes of sentencing, cite to authoritative sources,
and be subject to appellate review.20 9
Regardless of the way in which the court labels the deference to the
Guidelines, a sentencing court can achieve its goals of sentencing, as well as
the goals articulated by the SRA, after Booker.2 1 0 When a sentencing court
considers the Guidelines, the judge can hand out a sentence that is either
within or outside of the Guidelines by using the tools that the Guidelines
205. United States v. Biheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d 589, 594 n.6 (E.D. Va. 2005). The court sentenced
the defendant to a sentence within the Guidelines' range, but rejected the presumption of "heavy
weight" assigned to the Guidelines by Judge Cassell in Wilson. id.; see also United States v.
Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005).
206. United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
207. United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 367 (D. Mass. 2005).
208. See id.
209. Id. at 375-76.
210. See generally United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
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provide.21 Courts have already used these methods to achieve just
sentences in the early post-Booker world.212
V. DEPARTURES AND SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
Booker will cause a re-evaluation of the sentencing concepts that have
gained acceptance in the last twenty years. These concepts will either cease
to be relevant or transition to assume new meaning and significance in a
post-Booker world. In this section, I will discuss the impact that Booker will
likely have on departures and substantial assistance motions.
A. Departures No Longer Critical
Under § 3553(b) of the Guidelines, departures from the sentencing range
were permissible only if "there [was] an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by... the guidelines."'2 13  The Guidelines ranges were
intended to include all relevant information that would form the basis for a
departure.214
The defendant's role in the offense itself and his or her acceptance of
responsibility are examples of adjustments to the offense level. For
example, when a court went outside of the sentencing range established by
the Guidelines because of a substantial assistance notification by the DOJ,
2 15
or because there was a factor (good or bad) not adequately considered by the
Guidelines, 216 that was classified as a "departure."
Downward departures and adjustments occurred in two main categories:
(1) substantial assistance motions controlled by the government, 2 '7 and (2)
judicially initiated adjustments for acceptance of responsibility 218 and minor
role in the offense. 19 Under mandatory Guidelines, the scope of departures
was limited and criminal history was not relevant for downward
211. See discussion supra note 158 and accompanying text.
212. The use of § 3553(a) factors has already been a source for district court judges to achieve a
just sentence under Booker. See discussion infra Part V.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).
214. See id.
215. See discussion infra Part V.B.
216. See discussion supra note 44 and accompanying text.
217. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5KI 1.
218. Id. § 3El.
219. Id. § 3B1.2.
departures,"2 except in circumstances where it was relevant under section
4.A. 1.3.22 Judges were strictly prohibited from reducing the sentence in
cases where the defendant's family responsibilities, aberrant behavior,
community ties, or diminished capacity warranted mitigation.222 Now,
Booker eliminates this strict interpretation of departures/adjustments.223
It remains to be seen what courts will do about the departure/adjustment
concept in reaction to Booker. Before Booker, departure issues were a major
224focus of appellate review. Now, even if no traditional departure is
available, a court may still sentence a defendant outside of the advisory
guidelines in the exercise of discretion under § 3553.225 Courts no longer
have to resort to a "departure" or "heartland ' 2 6 analysis in order to achieve
an appropriate sentence.227 Any liberal departure analysis that might have
been reversed could now be upheld under Booker's reasonableness standard
and § 3553(a).22 8
1. Departure Option Remains in the Guidelines
The departure option nevertheless retains viability as part of the
Guidelines structure, and courts can continue to take previous departure
methodology into account when sentencing a defendant. 229 Thus, in both
setting a sentence and considering what would previously have been referred
to as a departure, courts can consult the Guidelines and give greater weight
to those factors that would not have been considered prior to Booker:
230
220. See id. § 4Al.3(b)(l)-(2).
221. Id.§5H1.8
222. See, e.g., PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 668 (2003).
223. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 765 (2005).
224. The Booker decision eliminated the de novo standard of review for sentences that were
imposed as part of the PROTECT Act:
In 2003, Congress... addled] a de novo standard of review for departures and insertled]
cross-references to § 3553(b)(1). Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 .... In light of today's holding, the reasons
for these revisions-to make Guidelines sentencing even more mandatory than it had
been-have ceased to be relevant .... Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts,
as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.
Id. at 765-66.
225. Id.
226. See discussion supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
227. The old terminology will most likely remain useful to courts as a reference point. However,
courts and litigants should refrain from using the Guidelines-focused terminology since it conjures
up the mandatory nature of the pre-Booker sentencing practice.
228. See discussion supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (Section 3553(a) of the Guidelines
provides for many factors that were rendered invalid in a mandatory sentencing scheme).
229. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750.
230. "The Guidelines permit departures from the prescribed sentencing range in cases in which
the judge 'finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
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"[u]nless the court calculates and then considers what the Guidelines advise
as to a particular sentence in a particular case-that is, the initial Guideline
sentence adjusted by any applicable departures-the court is not in a
position to follow Booker's requirements."2 3' Thus, courts inevitably will
consider the Guidelines' range when deciding whether the sentence will fall
within a range or outside of a range. However, the courts should not afford
extra weight to the Guidelines' range versus any of the other factors. This is
the key to post-Booker discretion.
Clearly, whether they agree with the Guidelines system or not, lower
courts have become accustomed to sentencing under a mandatory Guidelines
system. Disagreement with the harshness of the Guidelines is not an
invitation to now simply ignore them when imposing sentences. Most
judges have had experience with sentencing only under the Guidelines. 23 2
The majority of federal judges will, for the first time, have the opportunity to
divert from the mandatory ranges when imposing a sentence.233 Judges will
continue to consult the Guidelines as a touchstone on sentencing. After all,
for the last twenty years these mandates have been the cornerstone of federal
sentencing and have influenced many of the states' sentencing policies.
234
Therefore, sentencing procedures after the Booker decision will reduce the
ability of the government to control the outcome and favor a fair process by
giving the judge more, not less, sentencing information.235
Under Booker, lower sentencing courts can impose a "reasonable"
discretionary sentence. 6  In some cases, the Guidelines might provide a
reasonable estimation of an appropriate sentence for a particular offender.
Yet sentencing under Booker does not have to be whimsical. Courts can
give reasoned consideration to both the offender and the offense in order to
craft an appropriate sentence consistent with Booker.237 Courts can refer to
the Guidelines when deciding on the appropriate sentence without being
compelled to follow them. However, the presumption that the Guidelines
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines....' Id. at 750 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004)).
231. United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1285 (D. Utah 2005); see also United States
v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2005).
232. See discussion supra note 60 and accompanying text.
233. See discussion supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
234. See discussion supra note 60 and accompanying text.
235. See discussion supra note 77 and accompanying text.
236. See discussion supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
237. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 757 (2005).
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apply except in exceptional cases is a clear violation of the Booker
holding.23
8
After Booker, the old departure methodology need not control a
sentence outside of a Guidelines range because the Guidelines are "only one
of many factors that a sentencing judge must consider in determining an
appropriate individualized sentence. 2 39 The previous departures contained
in section 5K2.0(d) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.")
no longer constrain a sentencing judge.240 Courts may now consider the
Guidelines as advisory and only one factor under § 3553(a) in setting a
sentence.24 1 According to one district court, "a sentence under this format
will not represent a 'departure' under the Guidelines, and will not be
considered as a 'departure' for purposes of reporting or recording the
Court's post-Booker sentence. 242 Thus,
When the judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within
the Guideline range and states for the record that she is doing so,
little explanation is required. However, when the judge elects to
give a non-Guideline sentence, she should carefully articulate the
reasons she concludes that the sentence she has selected is
appropriate for that defendant. These reasons should be fact
specific and include, for example, aggravating or mitigating
circumstances relating to personal characteristics of the defendant,
his offense conduct, his criminal history, relevant conduct or other
facts specific to the case at hand which led the court to conclude
that the sentence imposed was fair and reasonable. Such reasons
are essential to permit this court to review the sentence for
reasonableness as directed by Booker.
2 43
2. Warranted Disparities and Individualized Sentencing
Congress did not intend the Guidelines to become rote, mechanical rules
that bound all judicial discretion. 24 Rather, "[t]he overriding statutory
directive to the Sentencing Commission was to eliminate 'unwarranted
disparity.' The concept of disparity that is unwarranted, however, is
238. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
239. United States v. Ameline, 400 F.3d 646, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2005).
240. Id. at 656.
241. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D. Me. 2005) (determining that it could not grant
a departure, but that it could achieve the same result under § 3553(a) after Booker).
242. United States v. Penniegraft, 357 F. Supp. 2d 854, 857 (D.N.C. 2005).
243. United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
244. KATE STITH & JOSt A. CABRENES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 51-52 (1998).
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intelligible only in the context of some accepted criteria for determining
what disparity is warranted-that is, what factors should be taken into
account in sentencing. 245
Sentencing cannot accomplish legitimate goals when it is absolutely
uniform nationwide regardless of any justifiable distinctions between
defendants or crimes. As the Booker remedial majority correctly observed:
[U]niformity does not consist simply of similar sentences for those
convicted of violations of the same statute .... It consists, more
importantly, of similar relationships between sentences and real
conduct, relationships that Congress' sentencing statutes helped to
advance and that [the charge-based] approach would undermine. In
significant part, it is the weakening of this real-conduct/uniformity-
in-sentencing relationship.., that leads us to conclude that
Congress would have preferred no mandatory system to the system
the dissenters envisage.246
The goals of the Sentencing Commission were to eliminate unwarranted
departures, not justified or warranted distinctions, and to advance the goals
of uniformity and proportionality.24 7 Warranted departures would be those
that include "factors [that] should be taken into account [when]
sentencing. 248  In drafting the Guidelines, the Commission sought to
establish a system that maintained fairness and avoided rote application in
sentencing practices. 249 Unfortunately, the Guidelines that were produced in
1987 became the rigid, mandatory, and inflexible rules that have offended
the sentencing policies and goals, thus motivating the present sentencing
overhaul.25°
A judge faced with two offenders who, on the surface, appear to be
identical, will now have options that were constrained under the pre-Booker
scheme. This judge can consider the many aspects of the crime, the way in
which it occurred, the particular background of the defendant, and both harm
245. Id.
246. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 761 (2005) (citations omitted).
247. See discussion supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
248. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 244, at 52.
249. See id. at 48 (indicating that the Commission would "create a just regime of sentencing ....
[where] like defendants committing life offenses would be treated alike, and arbitrariness, in the
form of undue leniency or undue harshness, would be eliminated.").
250. See discussion supra Part I.
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and culpability in reaching an appropriate sentence. Individualized
sentencing, by definition, factors in those nuances that are not necessarily
evident to the neutral observer. Factually distinct offenders should not be
treated in an identical manner. Identical treatment for factually distinct
defendants is actually an unjust outcome.25 2  In an advisory system,
sentencing these different offenders does not cause a problem. The court
can take into consideration the key differences between the offenders and
make an appropriate adjustment. Factors such as age, harm, the need for
rehabilitation, and criminal history can all make a significant difference in
the outcome of a sentence.253
Under the presumptive system, the judge was compelled to seek equal
treatment, something not necessarily indicative of just punishment. It was
difficult for judges to reach outside of the presumptive guidelines range to
impose a sentence that was just. In a sense, sentencing theory has come full
circle in that uniformity is not necessarily warranted and "blind uniformity
[can] promote inequality. '25 4  By reinvigorating judicial discretion, it
appears that the sentencing process will reduce the prosecutorial discretion
and control that was inherent in the mandatory system.
255
Because the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, the "guideline range is
only one of many factors that a sentencing judge must consider in
determining an appropriate individualized sentence. '256 Thus, a court need
not be concerned with "departures" from a range in order to arrive at the
sentence. A court may consider many factors and is not limited to those
factors that had governed departures under section 5K2.0(d) of the
U.S.S.G.2 57  Essentially, courts may sentence by using the Guideline
terminology to translate the findings under § 3553(a) into a numerical
sentence, but the concept of a "departure" applies only in situations where a
mandatory range is the only option. Once the Guidelines are advisory, the
notion of a departure is somewhat of a misnomer. Courts should take into
account that a sentence might be contrary to the goals of the Sentencing
251. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 760 (indicating that there is "no limitation concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted.., which a court... may receive and
consider .... ).
252. Id. at 760 (stating that such an incorrectly similar outcome would "undermine the sentencing
statute's basic aim of ensuring similar sentences for.., similar crimes [committed] in similar
ways.").
253. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000).
254. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 244, at 106.
255. Judicial discretion will moderate prosecutorial power because judges can consider many
more factors than they could otherwise consider under a mandatory system. While prosecutors
would urge the court to adhere to the Guidelines and sentence offenders to a "range" even where
there are key differences between offenders, under an advisory system the judge can balance the
disparate treatment and achieve a semblance of individualized justice.
256. United States v. Ameline, 400 F.3d 646, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2005).
257. Id. at 656.
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Reform Act if it distorts the goals of punishment or creates unwarranted
sentencing disparity.
3. Unwarranted Disparities--Crack/Cocaine
It is now evident that the increased criminalization effort has failed to
produce the desired results in decreasing the amount of crime, especially as
related to the war on drugs which has been a documented failure." 8 The
underlying reasons for the drug war and the intended targets of the war are
seldom those same individuals who are ultimately convicted and sentenced
to prisons29 Current federal drug policies, coupled with the massive
number of immigration cases in border states, have swelled the national
prison and jail population to over two million prisoners.2 60 There is a serious
disconnect between the laws targeting certain segments of major criminality
and the individuals who are ultimately imprisoned by these same laws. 26 I As
a result, sentencing practices have produced various anomalies that have
258. See generally FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 7, at 113-35. The "war on drugs" has been a
failure as it has not decreased the amount of drug abuse or criminal importation of massive quantities
of drugs. See id. Moreover, the drug policies have had a disproportionate impact on minorities by
virtue of the disparity between the harshness of punishment for crack as opposed to cocaine. See id.
There is a multitude of research on the subject of this disparity. See id.
259. See Sterling, supra note 66, at 395-99. The war on drugs was designed to convict "kingpins"
or those large-scale drug importers and distributors. See id. at 396. However, in reality the small-
scale drug dealers are the ones clogging the prisons. See id. at 385 n.10 (noting that even a small
amount of drugs "may require at least five years" in prison). In fact, it is not uncommon for the
girlfriends and minor conspirators to receive a harsher sentence under the Guidelines than the major
operators given that the minor players have no assistance to offer the government in exchange for a
lighter sentence. See id. at 395-99. The low-level dealers are the easiest targets, allowing
investigators to increase their statistics simply by observing a street comer in a minority
neighborhood to arrest many small time dealers en masse. See id. A full-blown investigation into
the importation of drugs, by major international crime figures, takes much more time, person power,
and resource commitment. See id at 418. The resulting conviction rate will not reflect the intensity
of the time and effort put forth to capture and prosecute such individuals. See id. (stating that a
combined total of only 34.9% of those convicted are either "high-level dealers" or "international
scope traffickers."). It is obvious to observers that the government is much better at getting many
small-time drug dealers and girlfriends than spinning its wheels to go after the major players. Id. at
411 (noting that congressional intent was to address the mandatory minimums for drug dealing to
combat the kingpins. Instead, the reality has been that the laws allow prosecutors to snare the lowest
level targets in the drug hierarchy). Mandatory minimums for small quantities of drugs allow the
government to gain convictions and skew statistics to support the claim that the drug war is being
effectively waged and won. Id.
260. TASK FORCE, supra note 67, at 16.
261. See discussion supra note 259.
outraged many observers because they are disproportionate.262 Clearly, the
objectives of many of the criminal laws, and the realities of the sentcncing
scheme, are often not aligned.
A pertinent example is the crack versus cocaine sentencing disparity
resulting in the imposition of a 100:1 sentencing scheme in cases involving
underlying criminal conduct related to crack rather than the powder form of
cocaine. 263 The powder form of cocaine is a preferred drug for whites while
the crack form of cocaine is preferred by blacks.2 64 The Guidelines system
increased, instead of decreasing, the racial disparity among offenders by
elevating the punishment depending on the form of the drug used. 265
Moreover, between 1984 and 2001, the average punishment for blacks grew
to be thirty months longer than the punishment for white felons.266 Despite
repeated calls for reform, this onerous provision of our drug laws has
remained with us and accounts for much of the tremendous increase in the
prison population.267 Rather than reduce disparities, the Guidelines have
made the situation worse. Federal prison population has swelled to
unprecedented numbers. While "only 13% of federal prisoners have been
convicted of a violent offense,. . . 55% are incarcerated for a drug
offense ... .268 Research fails to establish a link between incarceration of
the low-level drug courier and a corresponding reduction in the crime rate.269
262. Convicted individuals are receiving disproportionate sentences for minor crimes. See, e.g.,
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (describing how defendant "struck out" on his third
conviction and received fifty years to life for two petty thefts of video tapes).
263. For example, comparing Booker and Fanfan, Ducan Fanfan was initially facing 63-78
months for 500 grams of powder cocaine, while Freddie Booker faced a range of 210-262 month for
50 grams of crack cocaine. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746-47 (2005). The differences
between these two sentencing ranges points out the discrepancy between how crack and powder
cocaine are viewed under the current sentencing policies.
264. See FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 7, at 113 (stating that over "eighty percent of [crack cocaine
defendants] ... are Black .... ).
265. See id. at 115 (indicating that the gap between white and minority offenders was relatively
small during the "preguidelines era," and was at its greatest during the mid-1990s).
266. Id. at 116.
267. TASK FORCE, supra note 67, at 16.
268. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 7
(2005), http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/incareeration-crime.pdf (hereinafter Incarceration
and Crime). See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (2002), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2002
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/SBTOC02.htm.
269. The low level drug couriers and street level mules make up 66.5% of federal drug offenders
(crack) and 59.9% (cocaine). Incarceration and Crime, supra note 268, at 6-7. Despite
extraordinary drug policies, the inmate population in the U.S. has swelled to exceed two million
prisoners. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U. S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2002, at 1 (July 2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/p02pr.htm.
This, despite the fact that we have harsher laws on the books and longer prison terms.
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Within the black community, the number of black males in prison is grossly
disproportionate to their numbers in the general population. 270 The impact
of this massive incarceration of young, black males has horrendous
consequences for our society far beyond the immediate impact within the
specific prisoner's family and community.27 1
After almost twenty years of experience, the Sentencing Commission
recently concluded that, "the sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum
statutes, have a greater adverse impact on Black offenders than did the
factors taken into account by judges in the discretionary system in place
immediately prior to guidelines implementation., 272 In addition, the United
States Sentencing Commission recently observed that "the harms associated
with crack cocaine do not justify its substantially harsher treatment
compared to powder cocaine. 273
Before Booker, judges lacked the ability to adjust the inherent unfairness
between the sentences given to crack offenders compared with the sentences
given to cocaine offenders. At a 100:1 ratio, the harshness has been the
subject of much study and condemnation.274 In a post-Booker sentencing
world, judges can now consider whether the defendant's conviction justifies
this harshness. 275  One court explained the new options a sentencing judge
will be able to exercise:
As is now notorious, the guidelines create a 100 to 1 ratio between
crack and powder cocaine. In other words, the guidelines treat
possession of 50 grams of crack cocaine the same as they treat
possession of 5000 grams (5 kilograms) of powder cocaine....
270. For a thorough discussion of the implications of the current drug policies on the black
community, see Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
271. Id.
272. See FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 7, at 135.
273. See id. at xvi.
274. Although the Guidelines were intended to eliminate the disparity among sentences and
defendants, they have failed to do so regarding race. DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E.
CARLSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER?: THE TRANSITION TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 1986-1990 (1994).
The Guidelines have failed to remedy the crack/cocaine disparity. An offender convicted of selling
crack receives the same sentence as one convicted of selling 100 times the amount of cocaine.
Charles J. Ogletree, The Significance of Race in Federal Sentencing, 6 FED. SENT'G REP. 229, 230
(1994).
275. United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 773 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
653
Courts, commentators and the Sentencing Commission have long
criticized this disparity, which lacks persuasive penological or
scientific justification, and creates a racially disparate impact in
federal sentencing....
To its great credit, the Commission has repeatedly sought to reduce
the disparity.... Only Congress can correct the statutory problem,
but after Booker district courts need no longer blindly adhere to the
276100:1 guideline ratio.
In the wake of Booker, as noted above, several district courts have
already invalidated the punishment disparity between crack and powder
cocaine and imposed sentences below the range. When sentencing
defendants convicted of violations involving crack cocaine, these judges
have imposed sentences that fall below the ranges set forth under the
mandatory Guidelines structure.277 Thus, district courts have begun to do
what Congress has refused to do.
Sentencing courts are now instructed to take into account those factors
set out in § 3553.278 This includes "any pertinent policy statement issued by
the Sentencing Commission" even if that recommendation has not been
officially submitted to Congress as an amendment. 279 The Commission has
on three prior occasions called for reform of the crack/cocaine disparity.
2 8°
276. Id. at 777, 781. The court used a 20:1 ratio and sentenced the defendant below the
Guidelines. Id. at 782; see also United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1339 (M.D. Fla.
2005) (imposing a sentence below the Guidelines range, the court noted that disproportional
sentences not only violate the "not greater than necessary," provision, but also promote less respect
for the law because the outcomes are seen as unjust); United States v. Harris, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3958 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2005) (imposing a sentence under the Guidelines greater than necessary);
United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 780 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 3, 2005) (noting the disparity
between crack and cocaine as irrational and harmful, and substantially more than necessary to
achieve sentencing goals.)
277. See United States v. Harris, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3958, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2005)
(referring to the Sentencing Commission's observations on the disparity between crack and powder
cocaine, the court found them to be "persuasive authority" for the conclusion that the crack
guidelines are "greater than necessary"); Simon v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35, 49 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (recognizing the disparity between crack and powder cocaine and sentencing below the
guideline range); Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (conducting an in-depth analysis of case law and
stating that the 100: 1 ratio lacks justification and creates unwarranted sentencing disparity.)
278. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5)(A) (2000).
279. Id.
280. In 1995, 1997 and 2001, the Commission called for reform of the crack/cocaine sentencing
disparity. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, SENTENCING WITH DISCRETION: CRACK COCAINE
SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER 9-10 (2006), http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/crackcocaine-
afterbooker.pdf.
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Thus, courts are now prompted to take into account the Commission's past
policy statements when setting a sentence for a crack offender.28'
The First Circuit recognized the sentencing disparity that has "tormented
many enlightened observers ever since Congress promulgated the 100:1
ratio" and "share[d] the district court's concern about the fairness of
maintaining the across-the-board sentencing gap associated with the 100:1
crack-to-powder ratio .... The Guidelines should be amended to reflect
the realities that the crack/cocaine sentencing disparity is greater than
necessary to address the purposes of punishment.283
B. Substantial Assistance
1. Determinate Sentencing and Governmental Power
Critics of blind mandatory sentencing have long recognized that
offenders could be given the same sentence despite fundamental differences
between them.28 4 Blind uniformity in sentencing can frequently deny rather
than enhance justice.285  Because mandatory Guidelines transferred
tremendous power into the hands of prosecutors, reinvigorating judicial
discretion should have the positive outcome of moderating prosecutorial
discretion.286
One of the more unexpected outcomes of the Guidelines system was the
increase in prosecutorial power.287 The tremendous growth in prosecutorial
power in the last two decades was halted with the Booker decision.288 Pleas
will become less predictable, translating into less power for DOJ. 289 Despite
281. Id. at 17-19.
282. United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 65 (1st Cir. 2006).
283. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at v-viii (2002), http://www.ussc.gov/rscongress/02crack/2002crackrpt.htm.
284. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 244, at 104.
285. Id. at 105. The authors argue that "[u]niformity can itself be 'unwarranted:' when
unprincipled, blind uniformity promotes inequality." Id. at 106 (emphasis omitted).
286. Id. at 130.
287. Id. at 130. The government's charging decisions ultimately determined the sentencing
outcome. Id. Not only were prosecutors using certain charges as negotiation or bargaining tools, but
they could control the sentencing outcomes and further limit judicial discretion. See, e.g., Gary T.
Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing
Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61,94-95 (1993).
288. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 244, at 130.
289. See id. at 130-31. DOJ urges that the courts run the sentencing options through the
Guidelines to determine whether they are reasonable or not. Id. at 136. This approach runs afoul of
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the many positives brought about by the Guidelines, they are not, nor have
they ever been, comprehensive and accurate statements of appropriate
sentences in all cases falling within their ranges. Neither were they intended
to create enhanced discretion in the hands of prosecutors.
Over the last several years, sentencing decisions have quietly shifted
from the courts to the prosecutors and even to the police and investigators
who are involved at the initial stages of a criminal investigation.29
Executive control of sentencing is initiated well before the matter reaches
the courtroom.2 91 Prosecutors maintained the traditional powers such as the
power to either refuse to prosecute292 or to structure the charges in such a
way that the outcome is almost certain and a specific sentence almost
guaranteed. 293  Prosecutors have the ability to fast-track cases, file
misdemeanors, define the scope of monetary impact for purposes of
restitution and guideline categorization, and decide on the number of charges
to be filed.9
The Guidelines established a new era of prosecutorial control because a
sentence could be pre-determined by reference to the Guidelines.295 Crafting
an indictment with a certain monetary loss, or a quantity of drugs, or number
of victims could have dramatic consequences for a defendant's sentence,
simply because the characterization of the offense places the criminal
activity in certain specific guideline ranges. Charge bargaining became the
currency in federal criminal practice.296 Further, a prosecutor could choose
Booker because it assumes that a Guidelines sentence is reasonable. By implication, a non-
Guidelines sentence is per se unreasonable under this approach, a clear violation of Booker.
290. Id. at 128-29.
291. For example, even in cases where the legislature desires effective enforcement, the police can
foil enforcement by either refusing to investigate an offense or diverting the action to a less onerous
result outside of the court system, with street bargaining or formal diversion programs.
292. Prosecutor discretion is quite broad and essentially unreviewable. See Leslie C. Griffin, The
Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 275 (2001). A prosecutor can divert an
investigation into a civil case and the payment of a fine, handle it as a misdemeanor action, or
decline the case altogether. Id. at 269-70. There are numerous avenues of diversion depending on
the type of case. These types of diversions, to the extent that they avoid criminal prosecution, are
not challenged by the defense for obvious reasons. Moreover, the public is unlikely to be made
aware of these day-to-day realities except in cases that rise to public attention. Thus, prosecutors can
fashion not only the scope of the charges, and benefits to be awarded to a prospective defendant, but
they directly control the sentence to be imposed upon conviction. Id. at 273.
293. Prcsecutorial power is almost unlimited. Id. at 277 n.82. Today there are more federal laws
than ever, and the federalization of the criminal justice system has been the subject of much debate
and discussion. Federal prosecutors are some of the most powerful actors in the system since they
can derail an investigation without the obligation to justify such action.
294. See generally Griffin, supra note 292, at 266-77.
295. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000) (indicating that the court "shall" impose a particular sentence
of a particular crime).
296. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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to ignore conduct that would trigger mandatory minimum sentences in favor
of a theory allowing a favorable substantial assistance sentencing motion. 97
There is no doubt that crime legislation became more draconian in the
past twenty years with the enactment of thousands of new criminal laws.298
Massive federalization of crime has been widely criticized as an
unwarranted extension by the federal government into the province of the
states. 299  The dramatic surge in overall prison population has astounded
legal observers at the highest levels and is a national and international
disgrace. 300  Nevertheless, Congress has shown no signs of retreating from
its approach to infuse federal crime into almost every aspect of life.30 1
Along with increased federalization, Congress sought to reign in federal
court judges who were perceived to be sentencing defendants below the
guidelines range. 310 As a result of this alarm, Congress passed the
PROTECT Act of 2003,303 a law premised in part on the view that federal
judges were out of control in granting excessive downward departures from
297. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (indicating that "substantial assistance" could bring the
minimum sentence down).
298. "So large is the present body of federal criminal law that there is no conveniently accessible,
complete list of federal crimes." JOHN S. BAKER, JR. ET AL., THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL
LAW 9 (1998), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/overcriminalization/$FILE/fedcrimlaw2.pdf [hereinafter
CRIMINAL LAW].
299. Id. at 2.
300. Justice Anothony M. Kennedy, Speech at the ABA Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html. Justice
Kennedy explained that:
Were we to enter the hidden world of punishment, we should be startled by what we see.
Consider its remarkable scale. The nationwide inmate population today is about 2.1
million people. In California, even as we meet, this State alone keeps over 160,000
persons behind bars. In countries such as England, Italy, France and Germany, the
incarceration rate is about I in 1,000 persons. In the United States it is about I in 143.
Id.
301. See CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 298. The number and extent of crimes has grown so much in
recent years that the ABA Task Force cautioned that:
[lI]t is crucial that the American justice system not be harmed in the process .... In the
end, the ultimate safeguard for maintaining this valued constitutional system must be the
principled recognition by Congress of the long-range damage to real crime control and to
the nation's structure caused by inappropriate federalization.
Id. at 56.
302. See Bill Summary & Status for PROTECT Act (108th Cong.), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN00151 :@@@L&sumn2=m&.
303. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
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the sentencing Guidelines. °4 Despite the alarm sounded over unwarranted
judicial departures, the evidence establishes that it was not the judiciary, but
the executive, that was initiating over two-thirds of the downward
departures. °5
The United States Sentencing Commission found that from 1991-2001,
the percentage of sentences within the Guidelines range decreased from
80.7% in 1991 to 63.9% in 2001.306 Of those downward departures, two-
thirds of them were the result of government motions for substantial
assistance: 307 "[d]ownward sentencing departures were more frequently due
to prosecutors' substantial assistance motions (28 percent) than for any other
reasons (16 percent)., 308  During 2001, departures accounted for
approximately 10,000 out of 60,000 sentences, or roughly eighteen
percent. 30 9 Of this number, fully forty percent of these were initiated by the
government. 3 10  Only twenty-five of these were appealed, and the
government won nineteen of the twenty-five cases. 31' Thus, contrary to
what many observers believed, judicial downward departures were not
granted in excess or as merciful judicial acts. 312  The statistics belie the
perception that federal judges were granting unwarranted sentencing
reductions. We therefore should not expect that post-Booker sentences will
be unjustifiably lenient.3 13
304. See Bill Summary & Status for PROTECT Act (108th Cong.), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN00151 :@@@L&summ2=m&. The Feeney amendment to the PROTECT
Act was included with a very popular provision designed to quickly locate missing children, known
as the "Amber Alert" bill. Id. It passed with an overwhelming support in both the House and Senate
without the expertise or input of the Sentencing Commission. Id. The Senate vote was 98-0, and the
House vote was 400-25. Id.
305. See discussion supra notes 272-83 and accompanying text.
306. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: DOWNWARD
DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 32 (2003), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.pdf.
307. Id. at 67-68. The Guidelines provide that the government may file a substantial assistance
motion, called a "5K motion" in circumstances where the defendant "provided substantial
assistance" to the government in its investigation. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note
50, § 5Kl.1.
308. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES: DEPARTURES FROM
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND MANDATORY MINIMUMS SENTENCES, FISCAL YEARS 1991-2001, at 2
(2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04I05.pdf.
309. Pierre N. Leval, The Role of Departure, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 2004, at 2.
310. Id.
311. Id. As one federal judge recently observed in a speech to a meeting of the New York
Council of Defense Lawyers, "[tihat leaves six cases in which the government tried, but failed to
overturn a downward departure. So is there really a longstanding [or a serious] problem of
downward departure?" Id.
312. See Editorial, House Without Mercy, WASH. POST, Apr. 4,2003, at A20.
313. In fact, the post-Booker sentencing pattern reveals that 61.7% of the sentences are within the
guidelines range. Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, Post- 'Booker' Sentencing: Not What We
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2. 5K Motions
A clear example of prosecutorial discretion that troubled many was the
substantial assistance motion, commonly called the section 5K motion.'
14
This provision, of the Sentencing Guidelines titled Substantial Assistance to
Authorities, reads:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart
from the guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for
reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration
of the following:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of
the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the
government's evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any
information or testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the
defendant or his family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.315
The section 5K motion is a move for a government-initiated downward
departure motion for those situations where the defendant has cooperated or
offered assistance to the government. 16 In cases where the defendant
cooperates, but that cooperation is deemed insufficient, the government had
Might Have Expected, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 2, 2005, available at
http://www.magislaw.com/articles/07008050003Morvillo.pdf.
314. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5KI.1.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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the sole option to refuse to file the section 5K motion.3" 7 The court had no
power to grant any relief and the government had the final say whether it
was satisfied with the defendant's efforts.318
The problem with this lopsided scenario was that in many cases the low
level drug offenders were the ones snared in the government's net.319 As a
result, they frequently had no information to offer as to higher level
masterminds. Therefore, the reality is that our prisons are crowded with the
type of offender to whom the government did not offer a substantial
assistance motion, because the offender had no assistance to offer.320 This
most obvious example of a reduction of executive power means that
defendants will no longer have to depend on the government to file a section
5K motion for a judge to hear evidence of assistance or other reasons for a
sentence lower than the Guideline range.
The government will lose some of its bargaining power in exchange for
favorable motions because Booker has mooted the monopoly on substantial
assistance categories controlled by the government. Defendants will now be
able to seek departures from the advisory Guidelines range by petitioning the
court directly. A defendant can make a showing to the court that he
cooperated with the government, even if the government does not concede
that the cooperation is "substantial."
In an advisory sentencing system, a judge will have to explain the
different sentences imposed on two similarly situated defendants if
warranted.32' Judges should issue sentencing opinions so that a real,
317. In United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 380 (D. Mass. 2005), the defendant assisted
the government, but that assistance was not deemed worthy of a substantial assistance motion. The
judge noted that
[w]ith respect to Jaber's cooperation and acceptance of responsibility, Jaber labored
mightily to cooperate with the government. In a sealed affidavit, the defendant revealed
his considerable efforts to do so. In Florida, his cooperation did not produce any
prosecutions, ostensibly because of a change in personnel in the United States Attorney's
office. I cannot give Jaber "credit" for that cooperation simply because I do not have all
of the information in the government's possession. Nevertheless, Jaber's repeated efforts
to help law enforcement surely bear on his extraordinary acceptance of responsibility,
which is both a Guidelines factor and something that impacts on the likelihood of
recidivism.
Id. Since this was a post-Booker case, the judge was not bound by the fact that the government did
not file a 5K motion on the defendant's behalf, as would have been required under the mandatory
Guidelines regime. See discussion supra note 300 and accompanying text.
318. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5KI. I (indicating that it was only
upon "mote of the government" that the court could "depart from the guidelines.").
319. See discussion supra Part V.A.3.
320. See discussion supra Part V.A.3.
321. Frequently, a defendant will appear on the surface to be similarly situated to another
defendant. However, under closer inspection, the two defendants may be quite different and warrant
distinct punishments. For example, in United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 416, 427
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), a case dealing with fraud amounts, the judge stated "[i]n many cases.., the
amount stolen is a relatively weak indicator of the moral seriousness of the offense or the need for
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precedent-based common law of sentencing can emerge in the wake of
Booker. As long as the sentences are reasonable, an appellate court should
have no difficulty upholding the sentences as within the sound discretion of
the lower courts.322
3. Rebalance of Power
Booker altered the balance of power between the judge, the jury, and the
prosecution.3 23 Because the law allowed the range of possible sentences to
be tied to judicial fact-finding, the Guidelines failed to satisfy the
defendant's right to a Sixth Amendment jury trial.324 The traditional balance
of power that occurred between an executive that charges and a judge that
sentences was upset when the prosecutor controlled both the charging
decision and the likely punishment outcome.325 Judicial discretion can often
be a remedy for the harshness of the punishment or the overzealousness of
the prosecutor.
Defense advocacy can now attempt to minimize some of the coercive
nature of the Guidelines. This is a welcome return to the traditional status of
power between the prosecutor and the defense.326 A defendant can still seek
variances on sentences and the judge can still be within the Guidelines
because the Guidelines contain departure ranges.327
The length of a sentence was often driven by the way in which a
prosecutor charged the offender. Prosecutors are seldom in the best position
to adequately determine the appropriate sentence as a routine matter, 328 and
deterrence." Sometimes, the amount of fraud loss is dependent on fortuities of the timing of the
investigation, the aggressiveness of the government's undercover operation, and the return to victims
or even market forces. Id. Thus, gauging a sentence on amount of loss is not necessarily a relevant
indicator without reference to other factors. Id.
322. United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 488 (7th Cir. 2005). In Paladino, the government
cross-appealed a sentence that had been reduced from 235 months to 180 months because of
rehabilitation and an incorrect overstatement of the defendant's criminal history. Id. at 480. After
Booker, the government dropped its cross appeal. Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that "[u]nder the
new sentencing regime the judge must justify departing from the guidelines, and the justification has
to be reasonable, but we cannot think on what basis a 15-year sentence for Peyton, who was 34 years
old when sentenced, could be thought unreasonably short." Id.
323. See discussion supra Part V.B.1 -2.
324. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746, 756 (2005).
325. See discussion supra Part V.B.1-2.
326. See discussion supra Part I1.
327. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5Kl.1.
328. Prosecutors are focused on individual criminal investigations and disputes. As a result,
observers were critical of the power that prosecutors enjoy under the mandatory Guidelines system
since they controlled so much of the sentencing outcome, to the exclusion of the judiciary. See
lack the discretion or training to determine appropriate sentences on a
consistent basis.32 9 Rather, prosecutors are consumed with their individual
cases, and the policies and procedures within a judicial district.
When judges are performing their historic and traditional role of
imposing punishment, they can discern when the punishment does not fit the
crime or when the individual is a likely candidate for alternative punishment
that is not within the Guidelines scheme. The fact that two offenders have
an identical offense and prior record, although relevant, is not always a
compelling reason for identical punishments. The offenders may have very
different ages, backgrounds, military service, addictions, mental capacity,
educational levels, and family obligations and may otherwise appear
dissimilar in ways not visible on the bare record. Nevertheless, under a
mandatory system, the judge was obligated to sentence them in the same
category, an unwarranted result.
330
On the other hand, under a mandatory Guidelines sentencing structure,
similarly situated defendants could actually end up in very different
categories depending on whether the prosecutor favored one defendant over
another.33' The true difference between defendants is not always reflected
by the scores in a sentencing grid. Similar cases could end up falling within
very different ranges. Two defendants with different culpability and who
caused different harms could end up in the same sentencing range, and this
would still be consistent with the mandatory Guidelines structure.332 Judges
were troubled by this confinement since it restricted the sentencing options,
and many judges had great difficulty in crafting a method to get a sentence
outside of the range set by the Guidelines. 333 Given discretionary freedom,
many judges will choose to impose sentences tailored to each defendant.3
There is a greater likelihood of achieving justice in the post-Booker
generally Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471
(1993). Certainly, prosecutorial discretion has more potential to produce disparate sentencing
treatment than the conduct of the judiciary, if for no other reason than the sheer number of
prosecutors compared with federal district court judges. See generally id.
329. See generally Joy Anne Boyd, Power, Policy, and Practice: The Department ofJustice's
Plea Bargain Policy as Applied to the Federal Prosecutor's Power Under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, 56 ALA. L. REV. 591, 603 (2004) ("In response to the often disparate policies
for charging defendants, Ashcroft decided to remove individual prosecutorial discretion by once
again directing prosecutors to charge the 'most serious readily provable offense,' with very few
exceptions.").
330. See discussion supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
331. See United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 378 (D. Mass. 2005) (providing one
example of how two defendants were arrested for substantially similar crimes, but one was unable to
attempt to plea bargain because he had no inside contacts, where as the other one did, and plead).
332. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 761 (2005).
333. See id. at 742 (indicating that departures, beyond those already addressed, were difficult to
come by because it was presumed that "the Commission [would] have adequately taken all relevant
factors into account" when they drafted the Guidelines).
334. Seeid.at761.
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sentencing world than under the mandatory Guidelines system. As the
Supreme Court emphasized in Booker, a one-size-fits-all sentence is not the
goal.335  Rather, the focus should be on "similar relationships between
sentence and real conduct.,
336
VI. SECTION 3553(A) MANDATES INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING
Although severing the mandatory section of the Guidelines, the Court
left in place the adjoining § 3553(a).337 It reads:
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.-The court
shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this
subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established
for-
335. See discussion supra note 246 and accompanying text.
336. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 761.
337. Id. at 766.
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the
applicable category of defendant as set forth in the
guidelines-
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code...
and
(ii) that.., are in effect on the date the defendant is
sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised
release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section
994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code...
(5) any pertinent policy statement-
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 994(a)(2)... ; and
(B) that ... is in effect on the date the defendant is
sentenced;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense.338
Section 3553(a) will become the key to discretionary sentencing after
Booker by allowing judges to avoid both the unduly harsh, as well as the
indefensibly light sentences.339 Instead, sentencing should be reasoned,
338. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
339. See id. In the interim between Blakely and Booker, some courts felt constrained to sentence
as though the Guidelines never existed. One extreme example can be found in United States v.
Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757 (S.D. W. Va. 2004). In Shamblin, a judge sentenced Ronald
Shamblin after he pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 846, which criminalized a wide ranging
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. Id. at 758. The court held a resentencing hearing
pursuant to Rule 35, and after considering all of the factors the defendant's sentence went from life
under a pure Guidelines determination, to 240 months with the Apprendi filter, to twelve months in a
post-Blakely analysis. Id. at 759, 768. In calculating the sentence, the court reached the highest
offense level permissible on the Guidelines chart of forty-three. Id. at 762. The maximum statutory
sentence was twenty years. Id. Thus, sentencing in light of Apprendi reduced that actual sentence
that the judge could impose to twenty years or the statutory maximum. Id. After Blakely, the judge
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based on the exercise of sound discretion, producing more judicious
outcomes. Even the DOJ recognized the importance of judicial discretion in
sentencing when it directed all federal prosecutors in the wake of the Blakely
decision to "urge the court to impose [a] sentence, exercising traditional
judicial discretion, within the applicable statutory sentencing range," with
"recommendation in all such cases.., that the court exercise its discretion
to impose a sentence that conforms to a sentence under the
Guidelines .. ,,140 The Booker opinion restores the original impetus for
sentencing overhaul. Booker validates the § 3553(a) factors that were
rendered meaningless by the mandatory guidelines system.34 1
A. The Parsimony Provision
The parsimony provision of § 3553 reflects the philosophy that a
sentence should be "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to meet the
objectives of § 3553(a).342 This provision will take center stage in the post-
Booker sentencing era because judges will no longer be bound by the
Guidelines, and they should begin to seek the lowest punishment in order to
achieve the legitimate goals of sentencing.
The four purposes of sentencing are those traditional goals of
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation set forth in §
3553(a)(2):
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
considered the effects of both Apprendi and Blakely. Id. at 762-67. Based only on the sentencing
factors that the defendant admitted to during his plea, the court sentenced him to six to twelve
months. Id. at 768. Even the court found this to be an outrageous outcome. Id.
340. JAMES COMEY, MEMORANDUM TO ALL FEDERAL PROSECUTORS, DEPARTMENTAL LEGAL
POSITIONS AND POLICIES IN LIGHT OF BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON (July 2, 2004), at 2,
http://www.famm.org/pdfs/DAG%20Memo%200702041.pdf (emphasis added). The government
wanted to urge the continued use of the Guidelines and it continues to do so after Booker. Id. This
article argues that to simply continue to follow the Guidelines would be a violation of the principles
of Booker. See id.
341. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 766.
342. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). The so-called parsimony provision of § 3553 requires that the
sentencing judge impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes of punishment. Id.
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(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.
343
This subsection is critical because it is not simply another factor, but it
overrides all of § 3553. Although the Booker opinion did not focus on this
largely ignored provision of § 3553,34 it will likely become the focus of
future sentencing challenges. This parsimony provision essentially sets forth
an independent limit on what sentence a court may impose. As one court
has stated shortly after the implementation of the Guidelines:
I believe that a refusal to depart from the applicable guideline range
rises to the level of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). I base this
conclusion in part on the expressly mandatory language of that
provision, in part on well-settled administrative law principles
imported into the sentencing context by Mistretta v. United States,
and in part on the history, structure, and purpose of the SRA
considered as a whole.
Section 3553(a) requires-as a matter of law-that district courts
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet
the four purposes of sentencing set forth in subsection 3553(a)(2)-
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Imposition
of a sentence greater than necessary to meet those purposes is
therefore a violation of section 3553(a) appealable under subsection
3742(a)(1) and reversible under subsection 3742(0(1). The question
then becomes whether a sentence imposed pursuant to applicable
guidelines could ever be greater than necessary to meet the four
statutory purposes. I believe that it could.345
One anticipated result from the Booker decision is that courts will view the
Guidelines as just one of a number of sentencing factors.346 Courts can no
longer robotically apply the Guidelines without considering the individual
343. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).
344. See generally Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
345. United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 275-76 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
346. See discussion supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text. See also United States v.
Cawthorn, 429 F.3d 793, 802 (8th Cir. 2005) (district court has an obligation to "impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary..."); United States v. Neufeld, No. 04-10386, 2005 WL
3055204, at **9 (1 1th Cir. Nov. 16, 2005) (a "more-than-adequate sentence would conflict with §
3553(a)'s injunction against greater-than-necessary sentences"); United States v. Soto, No. 04-4767,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23306, at **4 (3d Cir. Oct. 27, 2005) (the sentence must be "adequate and
appropriate.., not greater than necessary.").
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characteristics of a defendant and the offense. 347  The remedial majority in
Booker directed sentencing courts to consider all of the sentencing factors
contained in § 3553(a).345 Under the prior mandatory Guidelines system,
these factors were usually ignored in favor of the Guidelines range.349 After
all, the judges could not consider any factors, with limited exceptions, since
the sentence had to fall within the Guidelines range.35 °
This point will become more evident as cases percolate through the
post-Booker sentencing process. Under § 3553(b), departures were
permissible only when "there [was] an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by ... the guidelines.",311 Thus, under the mandatory scheme,
courts could not consider factors that were already included in departure
ranges and presumptively taken into consideration by the Commission in
establishing the punishment ranges. Under U.S.S.G. section 5H, the
Guidelines set forth many factors that courts were not permitted to consider
in setting a sentence.352 This prohibition resulted from the interpretation of
the Guidelines as inclusive of these characteristics and thus, a court did not
need to go beyond the Guidelines.35 3 Judges' hands were tied.
Applying § 3553(a)(1) requires that the court evaluate the "history and
characteristics of the defendant, 354 and impose punishment with parsimony.
A defendant's characteristics and history could include many factors such as
347. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
348. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 767-68.
349. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 50, § IAI.1.
350. Id.
351. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).
352. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5H. Section 5H is titled "Specific
Offender Characteristics." Id. This policy statement addresses the "relevance of certain offender
characteristics to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline
range and, in certain cases, to the determination of a sentence within the applicable guideline range."
Id. For the most part, section 5H details those sentencing factors that are not ordinarily relevant in
"determin[ing] ... whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range .... " Id.
Notably, factors that might weigh in favor of a defendant are "not ordinarily relevant," such as age;
education and vocational skills; mental and emotional conditions; physical condition (including drug
or alcohol dependence); gambling addiction; employment record; family ties and responsibilities;
military, civic, charitable or public service; employment-related contributions; record of prior good
works; and lack of guidance as a youth. Id. § 5H1.1-1.6, 1.11-1.12. Factors that usually weigh
against a defendant are relevant in determining the applicable guideline range, such as: role in the
offense, criminal history, and dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood. Id. § 5H1.7-1.9.
353. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 742 (2005) (indicating that departures, beyond
those already addressed, were difficult to come by because it was presumed that "the Commission
[would] have adequately taken all relevant factors into account" when they drafted the Guidelines).
354. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
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the defendant's age, 355 education and vocational skills, 35 6 mental and
emotional condition, 357 physical condition, 35" employment record, 59 family
ties and responsibilities, 360 socio-economic status,36 1 civic and military
contributions,362 and lack of guidance as a youth.363 Mandatory Guidelines
rejected or ignored these other factors as irrelevant to sentencing, or as
already factored into the Guideline ranges. 364 Rather, sentencing judges
routinely considered a defendant's criminal history, the only aspect of the
defendant's history permissible under the Guidelines.365
Booker compels courts to broaden consideration of factors which are set
forth in § 3553(a). The court stated that "a sentencing judge would...
violate § 3553(a) by limiting consideration of the applicable Guidelines
range to the facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant, instead of
considering the applicable Guidelines range, as required by subsection §
3553(a)(4), based on the facts found by the court. 366
Restitution demonstrates the relevance of a sentencing factor that was
virtually ignored under the determinate system. For example, a defendant
required to satisfy a restitution order will ordinarily need to be employed.
Section 3553(a)(7) specifies that a court consider "the need to provide
restitution to any victims of the offense. 367 Courts have interpreted this
provision as allowing consideration as long as the departures for restitution
are within the Guidelines range.368 Under the mandatory guideline scheme,
§ 3553 did not allow a judge to depart from the Guidelines to achieve the
purposes of restitution. 369  This was because the Guidelines had already
factored restitution into the ranges set forth under section 3El. 1; acceptance
355. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5H1 .1.
356. Id. § 5H1.2.
357. Id. § 5H1.3.
358. Id. § 5H1.4.
359. Id. § 5H1.5.
360. Id. § 5H1I.6.
361. Id. § 5HI.10.
362. Id. § 5H11.1.
363. Id. § 5H1.12.
364. See id. § 5H; see also discussion supra note 338 and accompanying text. At least one
observer suggested some time ago that the Guidelines and their policies should only be factors to
consider along with other factors in setting the appropriate sentence. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal
Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101
YALE L.J. 1681, 1701-02 (1992).
365. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 50, §§ 5H1.7-1.9.
366. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005).
367. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (2000).
368. United States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1388 (7th Cir. 1994).
369. Id. at 1388-89.
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of responsibility. 370 Now a judge can fashion a sentence which more fully
considers the need and desire to make the victim whole, while still imposing
punishment for the crime.
Other factors will be critical as well. In sentencing a defendant below
the suggested Guidelines range, a judge noted how some of these factors will
bear upon the sentence:
[U]nder the circumstances of this particular case.., the sentence
called for by the guidelines, 168-210 months, was greater than
necessary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing set forth in
§ 3553(a). In other words, while this sentence may be disparate
from the sentence[s] given to other defendants who are "found
guilty of similar conduct", given the particular circumstances of this
case-[his] age, the likelihood of recidivism, his status as a veteran,
his strong family ties, his medical condition, and his serious drug
dependency-the Court does not view that disparity as being
"unwarranted., 371
The excessive sentences that have resulted in an overcrowded prison
system will eventually diminish as judges become more accustomed to being
able to consider a wide range of sentencing factors.372 Courts should use the
opportunity to consider all of the relevant sentencing factors and impose a
sentence that reflects just and proportional punishment.373
370. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 50, § 3El.I. The Commentary to
section 3E 1.1 "demonstrates that the Commission adequately considered restitution as a mitigating
circumstance when formulating the Guidelines." Seacott, 15 F.3d at 1388 (quoting United States v.
Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 323 (7th Cir. 1990)). Therefore, it was not an appropriate ground for
departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (departures are permissible only when "there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by... the guidelines .. "). Thus, under the mandatory scheme, courts could not
consider factors that were already included in departure ranges.
371. United States v. Nellum, No. 2:04-CR-30, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1568, at *15 (N.D. Ind.
Feb. 3, 2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)).
372. See discussion supra notes 68-69 (indicating that the loss of judicial discretion in sentencing
may have been the leading cause in the prison population increase).
373. Cf United States v. Lister, 432 F.3d. 754, 762 (7th Cir. 2005), where the court upheld as
reasonable a sentence at the top of the range, while at the same time cautioning the district court that
undue severity undermines the goal of proportionality:
Because this sentence was based on an adequate consideration of the § 3553(a) factors,
we cannot say that it is unreasonable. We take this opportunity, however, to respectfully
remind the district court that 1.84 kilograms of cocaine base is a moderate quantity
compared to those higher amounts contemplated by 21 U.S.C. § 841. Yet, in comparison,
the 405 month sentence nearly reaches the statutory maximum. Such a term leaves little
room for the proportional sentencing that motivated Congress to pass the sentencing
669
"[C]ourts must now consider all of the [section] 3553(a) factors, not just
the guidelines," since the Guidelines are only one out of five sentencing
factors. 3 4 "[W]here the Guidelines conflict with other factors set forth in
§ 3553(a), courts will have to resolve the conflicts. 375  Some courts can
conduct a detailed analysis of the weight to be afforded the section 3553
factors and ultimately diverge from the Guidelines.3 76 Courts, however,
might conduct this analysis and come out with a sentence squarely within
the Guidelines range. This process is the ultimate demonstration of judicial
discretion: the ability to consult factors, determine their weight, balance
them against a range, and determine an appropriate sentence.
B. Full Discretion and Voluntary Guidelines-State Court Precedents
As Congress considers whether to react to the Booker decision with
legislation,3 77 it should surely study the advisory sentencing schemes that
have been used successfully in a number of other states.378 The federal court
system can benefit from the states that have operated under an advisory
sentencing system with positive results. A common theme of the success of
these states is the flexibility inherent in their Guidelines, the method of
appellate review, and the opportunity for all parties to place on the record
the critical sentencing factors. 379 The result in Booker can lead the federal
government to a successful transition from a mandatory system to an
advisory one by referencing state systems.
For example, judges in Wisconsin sentence by reference to an advisory
guidelines structure and their sentences are reviewed on appeal for
guidelines, a motivation recognized and supported by the Supreme Court's second
holding of Booker.
Id. at 762.
374. United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 986 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
375. Id.
376. See id. (providing a roadmap detailing the court's methodology concerning post-Booker
sentencing factors).
377. See supra note 156 (stating that the "ball" is currently in Congress's "court."). Congress
should resist a hasty response to Booker, but instead take the necessary time to construct a renewed
sentencing scheme that rests on certain constitutional grounds. As the Sentencing Commission
assembles post-Booker sentencing data, it should assume a leading role in responding to Booker.
The Sentencing Commission has the power to not only gather data, but to also propose a solution
that takes into account the fundamental goals of the Sentencing Reform Act. Scholars have noted
the "puzzling" absence of leadership from the Sentencing Commission in plotting a course of action
following Booker. Douglas Berman and Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, What's The Future of Federal
Sentencing?, LEGAL AFF., Jan. 16, 2006
http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub-sentencingO106.msp (comments of Frank 0.
Bowman, Feb. 20, 2006).
378. See, e.g., State v. Gallion, 678 N.W.2d 197 (Wis. 2004); see also discussion infra notes 393-
94 and accompanying text.
379. See id.
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reasonableness.38 ° Wisconsin judges must demonstrate the reasons for their
sentences and connect these reasons with the goals of the sentencing
process. 381 Thus, the Wisconsin sentencing scheme "contemplates a process
of reasoning., 38 2  This includes a full explanation on the record of the
reasons for the sentence imposed.3 83 Courts must not "merely utter[] the
facts, invoke[] sentencing factors, and pronounc[e] a sentence.... Such an
approach confuses the exercise of discretion with decision-making. 384 In this
way, Wisconsin's scheme is similar to the post-Booker sentencing structure,
and provides a clue to the expected effectiveness and potential success.
Section 3553(c) will continue to require district courts to state the
reasons for the sentence imposed, because Booker left § 3553(c) in place.385
A sentence that is supported by specific written justification will likely be
found to satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement of Booker:386 "Post-
Booker we continue to expect district judges to provide a reasoned
explanation for their sentencing decisions in order to facilitate appellate
review.' 387
The success of Wisconsin and other advisory state systems bodes well
for the new federal approach to advisory guidelines. For one thing,
Wisconsin and other states have succeeded in utilizing guidelines to inform,
not replace, judicial discretion.388 The "end result ... was a state system of
advisory guidelines with comparative data and of appellate review of
sentences for reasonableness that can serve as proof that such systems can
effectively operate."
389
380. See generally id.
381. See Hunt & Connelly, supra note 153, at *11. The authors' review starts with advisory
sentencing schemes and explains the perceived strengths of these systems.
382. Gallion, 678 N.W.2d. at 201.
383. See McCleary v. State, 182 N.W.2d 512, 521 (Wis. 1971) ("In all Anglo-American
jurisprudence a principal obligation of the judge is to explain the reasons for his actions. His
decisions will not be understood by the people and cannot be reviewed by the appellate courts unless
the reasons for decisions can be examined. It is thus apparent that requisite to a prima facie valid
sentence is a statement by the trial judge detailing his reasons for selecting the particular sentence
imposed.").
384. State v. Gallion, 678 N.W.2d 197, 200. The Gallion court explained the definition of a
"truth-in-sentencing" environment, where it is necessary for sentencing courts to state on the record
their reasons for the sentence, for the benefit of both the defendant and the appellate record. Id. at
201. In Wisconsin, both the legislative mandate and the judicial precedent require courts to justify
sentences on the record. Id. at 202.
385. See United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2005).
386. See discussion supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
387. See Webb, 403 F.3d at 385 n.8.
388. See Hunt & Connelly, supra note 153, at *10-11.
389. Id. at *8.
With the decision in Booker, many judges are expected to take the
opportunity to exercise full discretion in sentencing in order to achieve a just
punishment.3 90 In his dissent, Justice Scalia reasoned that "logic compels the
conclusion that the sentencing judge, after considering the recited factors
(including the Guidelines), has full discretion, as full as what he possessed
before the Act was passed, to sentence anywhere within the statutory
range. ' '  Viewed as legitimate advisory guidelines, a court could sentence
a defendant as if operating within an indiscriminate sentencing scheme.392
The federal system can survive as an advisory system, as have other
states with advisory sentencing schemes. At least ten states have an
advisory sentencing system.3 93 The results under an advisory sentencing
scheme can accomplish the goals of the SRA, if the states may be used as
good evidence of successful advisory schemes. In fact, there are many
aspects of a voluntary system suggesting that such a system is actually more
likely to address the original goals of the SRA at least as effectively as a
mandatory system.394
VII. CONCLUSION
Booker has uprooted the sentencing procedures in federal court once
again. Not since the passage of the Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 has there
been so much upheaval in a sentencing scheme. While some defense
observers view Booker as the long awaited decision returning the system to
the pre-Guidelines era, this view would be premature. Courts will continue
to reference the Guidelines since, as a practical matter, most of the federal
judiciary has only had experience with a mandatory Guidelines system. The
390. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 791 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (implying that since
judges will have their pre-Booker discretion restored, they will most likely utilize that discretion).
391. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
392. See generally United States v. Montgomery, No. 03-5256, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14384 (6th
Cir. July 14, 2004), vacated by United States v. Montgomery, No. 03-5256, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
15017 (6th Cir. July 19, 2004). The Sixth Circuit sentenced a defendant to a probationary period for
bank fraud with the expectation that she serve her time in a halfway house as was the tradition for
the last 15 years. Id. at *2, 4. When the Department of Justice changed the policy, the defendant
appealed and this allowed the court to reconsider not only the original sentence, but the impact of
Blakely which was decided in the interim. See id. at *4-6. As the Sixth Circuit stated,
in order to comply with Blakely and the Sixth Amendment, the mandatory system of fixed
rules calibrating sentences automatically to facts found by judges must be displaced by an
indeterminate system in which the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in fact become
"guidelines" in the dictionary-definition sense ("an indication or outline of future policy."
The "guidelines" will become simply recommendations that the judge should seriously
consider but may disregard when she believes that a different sentence is called for.
Id. at *8 (citations omitted).
393. See Hunt & Connelly, supra note 153.
394. See id. (reviewing advisory sentencing schemes and explaining the perceived strengths of
such systems).
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key question will be what amount of deference should be afforded.
Unfortunately, the circuit courts that have addressed sentencing in the early
post-Booker decisions are avoiding Congress' command in § 3553(a) to
impose a sentence "not greater than necessary" to serve the purposes of
punishment by presuming that a within-guidelines sentence is reasonable.395
Courts that are resisting the change announced in Booker, by continuing to
give great weight to the Guidelines, are missing the point. They are quite
possibly sentencing in violation of the constitutional principles announced in
the case and continuing the "rote" sentencing that was at issue in Booker.
3 96
Some district courts have imposed sentences by carefully following
Booker, considering factors other than the Guidelines, and imposing
sentences that are not greater than necessary to meet the goals of
punishment.3 97
Booker provides the opportunity to address the problems that have
plagued federal sentencing since the passage of the SRA and the
establishment of the Guidelines. The Sentencing Commission will continue
to monitor appellate opinions and make recommendations on the workings
of sentencing policies. The Commission will collect and analyze data,
prepare reports, and offer training to the ninety-four federal judicial districts.
As the Commission follows its natural amendment cycle and maintains a
working relationship with Congress, sentencing policies may actually
achieve the original intent of the SRA. One commentator urges the
Commission to do more:
"If a fundamental reconfiguration of federal sentencing structures is
to occur, someone or some institution outside of Congress, the
395. See cases cited supra notes 119, 180.
396. Based on the reasonableness review to date, it seems that the courts are upholding sentences
that are within the Guidelines' range, finding those sentences "reasonable," and scrutinizing those
sentences that are lower than that suggested by the Guidelines. See Berman, Reasonableness
Review, supra note 187. One district has explicitly found that to adhere to the Guidelines and
impose a drug sentence in accordance with the 100:1 ratio would be to render the Booker decision "a
nullity." United States v. Fisher, No. S3-03-CR-1051, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23184, at *28
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
397. United States v. Carvajal, 2005 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 3076, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (imposing a
sentence of 168 months instead of a Guidelines-recommended sentence of 262-327, so as not to
"destroy[] all hope and take[] away all possibility of useful life. Punishment should not be more
severe than that necessary to satisfy the goals of punishment"); United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp.
2d 278, 303 (D.R.I. 2005) (sentencing the defendant to the mandatory minimum of 120 months, the
court found that to sentence in accordance with the Guidelines was "substantially greater than is
necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide for
adequate general and specific deterrence.").
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Justice Department, and the robed judiciary will have to take the
lead in formulating and advancing it. Congress lacks the expertise
for the job. DOJ has the expertise but not the motivation. The
judges don't do legislation. Institutionally, that leaves the
Sentencing Commission. One of the most puzzling features of the
post-Booker landscape is the absence of the Commission as
anything other than a gatherer of data. The Commission has the
time, the expertise, the data, and (one would think) the motivation
to take a leading role in molding thinking about where we should go
from here. 398
As the Commission prepares to issue a report on federal sentencing, the
Federal Public Defender made its perspective known in a letter to the
Commission, urging a renewed approach to sentencing and close monitoring
of the results of some of the recent decisions implementing Booker.399
Clearly, sentencing issues will evolve as the lower and appellate courts
continue to interpret Booker. A welcome dialogue resulting from this
decision is the common law of sentencing contemplated by the SRA:
An advisory guidelines system would promote some degree of
sentencing uniformity because (1) judges would still be required to
"take account of' and "consult" the guidelines in determining a
sentence, and (2) sentences would still be subject to the
harmonizing effect of appellate review, with the Sentencing
Commission able, in turn, to make guideline amendment decisions
based on appellate case law."400
As appellate courts interpret sentences under the reasonableness
standard, lower courts will refine and mold sentencing policies; something
expected when the SRA was first enacted. This article suggests two modest
outcomes: (1) that Booker mandates that the judiciary consider factors
outside of the Guidelines range; and (2) that the reasonableness standard
allows for full consideration and deference to the sentences imposed, which
is something that has been lacking in sentencing for almost twenty years. In
this time of sentencing reconsideration, the courts and the legislature must
take this opportunity to honestly examine the reforms of the last years and
make adjustments that reflect the true balance of power. If the advisory
398. Berman & Bowman, supra note 377.
399. Letter from Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, to Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, U.S.
Sentencing Commission (Jan. 10, 2006),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-jand policy/files/letter to_ussc_ 110061 .pdf.
400. Federal Defender Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Booker Litigation Strategies
Manual, A Reference for Criminal Defense Attorneys, Feb. 17, 2005, (revised April 15, 2005), at 4,
available at http://www.norml.org/pdf files/BookerLitigationStrategies5_April 1505.pdf.
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guidelines give true meaning to § 3553, then judges have fully restored
discretion to consider both the Guidelines and other valid, relevant factors.
The current practices have failed to achieve the reasoned sentencing that
was the initial goal of the SRA. Now, at this juncture, all interested parties
can urge Congress to take a wait-and-see approach to the post-Booker world,
especially to ascertain the precise statistics about "reasonableness" review of
sentences imposed after Booker. Congressional steps to further limit judicial
discretion are decidedly not the correct response to Booker.40 1 As is evident
from many of the cases thus far, the courts are not blindly avoiding the
Guidelines. 402  Rather, they are giving reasoned consideration to the
Guidelines ranges and setting a sentence both within and without the range.
This is true discretion and, after all, the SRA had hoped to achieve this result
more than twenty years ago.
401. See Defending America's Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1528, 109th Cong. (2005). Congress has already acted in response to
Booker with proposed H.R. 1528. Id. This bill, titled "Defending America's Most Vulnerable"
proposes to constrain judicial discretion by forbidding consideration of dozens of potentially
mitigating factors in sentencing. Id.
402. Government statistics establish that after Booker, 61.7% of the sentences have been within
the Guidelines range, 14.6% have been controlled by government-initiated 5K motions, 12.8% of the
sentences are otherwise below the Guidelines range, 9.5% are other government-sponsored
departures, and 1.4% of the sentences are above the Guidelines range. U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT 2 (2005),
www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_120105.pdf.
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